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PREFACE
The purpose of this publication is to provide a report on the development
and application of the Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype
(SHARP) for the operations of the telecommunications system and link
analysis functions in Voyager mission operations. The report is intended
primarily for a mixed audience of technical managers and system
developers in the area of mission operations automation. The report
provides an overview of the design and functional description of the
SHARP system as it was applied to Voyager, Some of the current problems
and motivations for automation in real-time mission operations are
discussed, as are the specific solutions that SHARP provides. This report
is not a substitute for detailed documentation, which is being prepared
separately.
The application of SHARP to Voyager telecommunications had the goal of
being a proof-of-capability demonstration of artificial intelligence as
applied to the problem of real-time monitoring functions in planetary
mission operations. Members of the Artificial Intelligence Group of the
Advanced Information Systems Section at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
sought to demonstrate and evaluate the capability in one of the planetary
exploration program's most rigorous environments -- real-time operations
during a planetary encounter. The encounter of the Voyager spacecraft
with the planet Neptune in August 1989 provided the SHARP team with
this opportunity. As part of achieving this central goal, the SHARP
application effort was also required to address the issue of the design of
an appropriate software system architecture for a ground-based, highly
automated spacecraft monitoring system for mission operations, including
methods for: (1) embedding a knowledge-based expert system for fault
detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR) within this architecture; (2)
acquiring, managing, and fusing the multiple sources of information used
by operations personnel; and (3) providing information-rich displays to
human operators who need to exercise the capabilities of the automated
system. In this regard, SHARP has provided JPL with an excellent example
of how advanced artificial intelligence techniques can be smoothly
integrated with a variety of conventionally programmed software
modules, as well as guidance and solutions for many questions about
automation in mission operations.
From a broader, operational perspective, SHARP has shown that a large set
of mission operations functions in the area of real-time monitoring of
spacecraft health and status can be effectively automated, with
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significant payoffs in the areas of safety, workforce savings, personnel
productivity, and system reliability. These payoffs are discussed in the
latter pages of the report. As SHARP migrates into operations and
additional applications are prototyped, we expect to continue to refine and
quantify the payoffs from artificial intelligence applications to mission
operations.
SHARP has received widespread attention in the press, ranging from the
mass news media to highly technical journals. News articles about SHARP
have appeared in Information Week Magazine, AI Week, Computerworld,
Computers and Physics Journal, Federal Computer Week, Symbolics
Symposium, IEEE Expert, IEEE Spectrum, Government Executive Magazine,
Insight, Aerospace Engineering, The Washington Times, The New York
Times, The Los Angeles Times, Nikkei Artificial Intelligence (Japanese
publication), and the Journal of Commerce. While this level of attention is
certainly exciting, it also indicates the importance that both
technologists and users are attaching to effective applications of
artificial intelligence.
The SHARP application to Voyager telecommunications was conducted as
part of a long-term research and development task being conducted for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Office of
Aeronautics and Exploration Technology (OAET) Artificial Intelligence
Program called "Ground Data Systems Automation". This task, which began
in October 1987 has the on-going objective of developing and
demonstrating automation technologies that enable and enhance multi-
mission capabilities of operations ground systems for planetary
spacecraft and for the Deep Space Network (DSN). Additional support for
the development of the SHARP system was provided by the NASA Office of
Solar System Exploration and by the NASA Telescience Testbed Program,
managed by the NASA Ames Research Center.
Currently, under joint sponsorship of the NASA OAET Artificial
Intelligence Program and JPL Flight Projects Support Office, a SHARP
"shell" is being readied for transfer to the Space Flight Operations Center
(SFOC) in the summer of 1990, where it will be used beginning in August
1990 for the Magellan spacecraft's telecommunications operations. At
that time, the SHARP shell will be fully compatible with the SFOC
environment, meet SFOC user interface and data interface requirements,
and be in compliance with JPL software standards for flight software.
This shell will be a major component of the Multimission Spacecraft
Analysis System (MSAS) tool set which the JPL Flight Projects Support
Office is developing. Additionally, the JPL DSN Office of Engineering is
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applying SHARP technology to telecommunications link performance
analysis as part of the Network Operations Control Center (NOCC) upgrade,
scheduled for operations in 1991.
With the success of the application for Voyager telecommunications, and
follow-on tasks under way which will carry the technology forward into
operational systems, we feel that the major objectives set for SHARP
have been achieved and that there are now opportunities for multiple
applications of artificial intelligence in planetary mission operations.
This would not have been possible without the tireless efforts of the
SHARP development team and the strong, continuing support we have had
from individuals throughout JPL and NASA. In addition to assisting me
with management of the Ground Data Systems Automation task, the SHARP
development team was lead by Mark James, whose unswerving devotion to
detail, the highest qualities of software workmanship, and personal
programming fortitude are at the core of SHARP's success. The SHARP
software developers, Dr. Harry Porta, Gaius Martin, Denise Lawson, Erann
Gat, and Bruce Elgin, displayed high competence and creativity. Denise
Lawson did an superb job as the lead knowledge engineer for SHARP. Harry
Porta's user-interface graphics for SHARP have been especially effective
in helping Telecom users operate the system. Special acknowledgement is
deserved by Boyd Madsen, the supervisor of telecommunications
subsystem operations for Voyager and other spacecraft, who had the
vision to see what was needed, the commitment to make SHARP happen,
and the patience to deal with stubborn technologists. John Carnakis, Lieu
Nguyen, Ray Stagner, Ken Atkins, and Ted Bahrami made early
contributions to the SHARP effort which educated us about the world of
flight projects and helped us get on the right track towards a reasonable,
and desirable demonstration target. Giulio Varsi, Wayne Schober, Art
Zygielbaum, Dave Nichols, Mike Sander, Dave Linick, and Norm Haynes
helped secure the funding for SHARP and have provided essential support
and representation for us to JPL and NASA management. The entire SHARP
team is also grateful to our line management, Chartie Beswick and Tom
Thornton, for their rock solid support throughout the planning and
execution of this task. Finally, SHARP would not have come to pass
without the confidence and vision of our sponsors in NASA, Mel
Montemerlo, Joe Bredekamp, and Ann Merwarth, and the support of the
NASA OAET Artificial Intelligence Intercenter Working Group.
David J. Atkinson
JPL, April 3,1990
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ABSTRACT
This publication provides a report on the development and application of
the Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP) for the
operations of the telecommunications system and link analysis functions
in Voyager mission operations. The report provides an overview of the
design and functional description of the SHARP system as it was applied
to Voyager. Some of the current problems and motivations for automation
in real-time mission operations are discussed, as are the specific
solutions that SHARP provides.
The application of SHARP to Voyager telecommunications had the goal of
being a proof-of-capability demonstration of artificial intelligence as
applied to the problem of real-time monitoring functions in planetary
mission operations. As part of achieving this central goal, the SHARP
application effort was also required to address the issue of the design of
an appropriate software system architecture for a ground-based, highly
automated spacecraft monitoring system for mission operations, including
methods for: (1) embedding a knowledge-based expert system for fault
detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR) within this architecture; (2)
acquiring, managing, and fusing the multiple sources of information used
by operations personnel; and (3) providing information-rich displays to
human operators who need to exercise the capabilities of the automated
system. In this regard, SHARP has provided the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
with an excellent example of how advanced artificial intelligence tech-
niques can be smoothly integrated with a variety of conventionally pro-
grammed software modules, as well as guidance and solutions for many
questions about automation in mission operations.
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1. Introduction
The Voyager 1 and Voyager 2 spacecraft were launched from Cape
Canaveral, Florida, in 1977. The technology to monitor the health and
status of these probes was designed and developed in the early 1970s.
This now antiquated technology, coupled with the heroic efforts of many
JPL personnel over the last 13 years, has carried Voyager 2 through near-
fatal catastrophic events to four of the outer planets of our solar system.
Despite the spacecraft's failed radio receiver, sunlight damage to the
photopolarimeter scientific instrument, and partially paralyzed scan plat-
form (which houses Voyager's imaging system), JPL engineers have kept
Voyager operational, enabling the capture and transmission of vast
amounts of invaluable information and images of the Jovian, Saturnian,
Uranian, and Neptunian systems.
1.1. Spacecraft Monitoring Operations Problems
During critical periods of the Voyager mission, up to 40 real-time
operators are required to monitor the spacecraft's 10 subsystems on a 24-
hour, 7-day-per-week schedule. This does not include the numerous
subsystem and scientific instrument specialists who must constantly be
available on call to handle emergencies.
Unlike the 1980s, when JPL mission operations could focus on the two
Voyager spacecraft, in the coming decade there will be an increasing
number of planetary exploration spacecraft flying at the same time. In
addition to the Voyagers, the Galileo and Magellan spacecraft have been
launched in the past year and are now on their way to Jupiter and Venus,
respectively. The Ulysses, CRAF (Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby), Mars
Observer, and other spacecraft will follow in the next few years. To
accommodate the increasing load on mission operations, JPL has
established a Space Flight Operations Center (SFOC) to replace the
individual mission control teams and spacecraft teams for each mission.
A single, multimission flight team will operate all of the spacecraft. As
more spacecraft are launched and begin to carry out their missions, SFOC
will require significant advances in automation technology to support the
increasing workload on operations personnel and to ensure the safety of
the spacecraft.
1.2. Voyager Telecommunications Monitoring Operations
Telecommunication with the Voyager 2 spacecraft suffers from frequent
anomalies and requires coordination of efforts of monitoring and
diagnosis of both the spacecraft and ground telecommunications systems.
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Due to cumbersome and time-consuming manual processes and obsolete
technology which will be discussed in later sections, severe limitations
exist on the current methods of analyzing Voyager telecommunications
data. Even with the substantial improvement in computing support which
is part of the new SFOC, the telecommunications area is both an
operations area sorely in need of automation as well as one of the most
challenging to automate.
As noted earlier, each spacecraft is monitored on a continuous basis. To
enable the receipt and collection of spacecraft engineering data, JPL
operates three complexes of antennas located around the world. These
complexes comprise NASA's Deep Space Network (DSN). With the
exception of occultations and a short gap between two of the stations
(Canberra and Madrid), a spacecraft is always in view from one of these
Deep Space Stations (DSS), as the complexes are called.
Four of the most important functions that are part of analysis of the
telecommunications link between the spacecraft, DSN, and ground system
computers at JPL are (1) the numerical estimation of telecommunications
subsystem and link performance, (2) the monitoring, of real-time
telecommunications activity, (3) the detection of failures or degraded
performance, and (4) the diagnosis, isolation, and recovery from these
problems. To accomplish each of these functions, a wide variety of
information must be accessed and processed manually by an operator.
This information is described in later sections.
As a result of the amount of data needing to be manually processed and
analyzed, there remains the potential that serious errors could occur in
the monitoring of the spacecraft. This could occur because of the lack of
appropriate data or the lack of a timely response to a critical situation.
In telecommunications as in other areas, the ultimate diagnosis, isolation,
and recovery from failures, anomalous conditions, or degraded system
performance often requires the intervention of experts who have years of
specialized experience operating spacecraft subsystems (e.g., power,
thermal, telecommunications). One of the most serious limitations on the
current method of mission operations is the dependency upon the critical
flight skills of these experts. These specialists must be on call at any
time, and are frequently consulted on a daily basis. The timeliness of an
expert response to a problem can be critical in saving a spacecraft.
Furthermore, when the experts retire, their critical skills are lost to
mission operations. The Voyager 2 spacecraft has already been flying for
almost 13 years, and is expected to operate until 2018. Many future
spacecraft are expected to have similar longevity. The accumulated
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expertise of mission operations personnel is a critical resource which
should be preserved, and not recreated every time a senior engineer leaves
the flight project.
1.3. The SHARP Response
To assist the flight operation teams to preserve the safety of spacecraft,
to increase the productivity of the team members, and to maintain the
knowledge acquired through years of flight experience, it is necessary to
automate many of the current procedures and to capture the decision
making process of the experts. Major challenges for these are: the
elimination of manual data processing, assistance in data interpretation,
and the automated real-time anomaly detection and analysis.
The Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP) was
developed as part of an ongoing effort to apply artificial intelligence (AI)
techniques to mission operations automation. The primary task for an
operational SHARP system will be multi-mission monitoring and diagnosis
of spacecraft and ground systems in the Space Flight Operations Center.
As tools such as SHARP are developed, they are demonstrated and
evaluated in tough, operational settings to prove their performance. The
Voyager 2 spacecraft was targeted for the initial demonstration of the
SHARP system. The spacecraft's August 1989 encounter with the planet
Neptune afforded an excellent opportunity to evaluate SHARP in a rigorous
environment. The monitoring and troubleshooting of the telecom-
munications subsystem on board Voyager 2 and the process of real-time
telecommunications link analysis were selected as the initial operations
functions to be automated.
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2. SHARP Overview
The Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP) introduces
automation and artificial intelligence technologies to the process of
monitoring spacecraft operations. One of the goals of SHARP is the
elimination of much of the mundane processing and tedious analysis
currently required of operations personnel. Another goal is to provide
faster and more reliable identification of errors that occur during a
spacecraft mission than is currently available. The major automated
functions provided by the SHARP system include:
• Real-time anomaly detection and diagnosis;
• Visualization of channelized data and system status;
• Acquisition and centralization of operations data in a single
workstation, including real-time spacecraft and groun_ system
engineering data, sequence of events, and alarm tables;
• Real-time analysis of spacecraft performance predictions;
• Integration with specialized numerical analysis software, e.g., Fast
Fourier Transforms for determining spacecraft antenna pointing
accu racy.
The SHARP prototype was developed for use in the Voyager
telecommunications (telecom) monitoring area. The SHARP system
provides telecom personnel with an environment that allows them to have
a more complete understanding of how the telecommunications link is
functioning between a spacecraft and the Deep Space Stations (DSS). Deep
Space Station sites are located at Goldstone, California, Madrid, Spain,
and Canberra, Australia, and collectively form NASA's Deep Space Network
(DSN).
The SHARP environment contains the necessary data to allow SHARP to
oversee the expected behavior of the spacecraft and DSS it is monitoring.
It also receives real-time data which reveal how these systems actually
are performing. If the real-time data fails to correlate to the expected
behavior, SHARP informs the operator responsible for the monitoring
operation that an alarm condition exists. It also lists the potential
causes for this anomaly and suggests what actions to take to respond to
the alarm condition.
In SHARP, the automation of fault detection and diagnosis is accomplished
through the use of artificial intelligence programming techniques.
Artificial intelligence techniques are distributed throughout all
components of the SHARP system. Artificial intelligence programming
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methodologies have enabled more effective automation and thorough
analysis by SHARP functions.
In addition to having complete access to all of the relevant data which
allow SHARP to perform its necessary analysis functions, the SHARP
system contains an extensive collection of graphical displays. These
displays give the operations personnel a comprehensive view of the status
and dynamics of the systems that they are monitoring.
Figure 2-1 illustrates a top-level view of the SHARP system. Shown are
the individual modules that comprise the system, as well as relevant
components that are external to the Voyager application of SHARP. SHARP
is implemented in Common LISP on a Symbolics 3650 color LISP Machine.
The system is currently being ported to a Sun workstation, also running
Common LISP. SHARP relies extensively on an expert system building
language calted STAR*TOOL, devetoped at JPL.
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Figure 2-1 SHARP System Overview
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2.1. Inputs
In order for the SHARP prototype to analyze the telecommunications link
from the spacecraft through the Deep Space Network and ultimately to the
computers at JPL, a wide variety of information and data must be
accessed and processed. Some data and knowledge are acquired before
operational use and are stored in databases or are encoded within the
SHARP program. Other data are collected in real time during operational
use.
The following gives a short description of the data. The procedures used
for acquiring, processing, and storing the data are covered in Section 3.
Figure 2-2 gives a summary the source of each type of data, where it is
encoded in SHARP, and who has the capability to modify the data.
Data LocationSource
in Sharp
Database
Modifiable by
Predicts Univac Text File N/A
ISOE Univac Text File Database User
Channelized Data Real Time Database N/A
Alarm Limits Domain Expert Data Tables User
Rules CodeDomain Expert Programmer
Figure 2-2 SHARP Input Data
Predicts
These are predictions of values for spacecraft and Deep Space
Network station parameters based on numerical models of system
performance.
Integrated Sequence of Events (ISOE)
This is a time-ordered sequence of scheduled spacecraft and DSS
activity. Examples of these include: specifications regarding
timing and the transmitter power and frequency at the DSS for
uplink commands being sent to the spacecraft, when the
spacecraft is performing maneuvers, the state of the receivers and
transmitters on the spacecraft, etc. Last minute corrections,
additions, or deletions to these events can be made by the operator.
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Channelized Data
This is real-time engineering data that contain information
regarding the status of systems both on board the spacecraft and
at the DSSs.
Alarm Limits
These are minimum and maximum values that specify the
boundaries of the nominal values for engineering data. Error
conditions, i.e., alarm states, occur when the engineering data
exceed these limits. Changes to these limits can be made by the
operator in response to planned spacecraft state changes as well
as unforeseen changes in the behavior of the systems being
monitored.
Rules
These contain knowledge of how the various systems that SHARP is
monitoring should behave and interact. These rules use that
information and the data described above to determine the
existence of either simple or complex error conditions, and to give
hypotheses regarding the causes of these errors.
2.2. Processing
There are several kinds of processing which occur within the SHARP
system. These are:
° Capturing the real-time channelized data and storing it in a
database,
• Using conventional and artificial intelligence techniques to
analyze the real-time data for the occurrence of alarm
conditions,
• Determining probable causes and responses to alarm
conditions, and
• Displaying data and management of the various displays.
SHARP runs in a multi-processing environment with interactions among
the different kinds of processing.
The processing is covered in more detail in Section 4.
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2.3. Outputs
The primary purposes of the SHARP system are to provide a better
operational environment for monitoring various spacecraft and DSS
systems, to warn an operator if there is an alarm condition in any of the
systems that SHARP is monitoring, to assist the operator in determining
the cause of an alarm, and to suggest actions to take in response to an
alarm. The means used to communicate this information consist of a
number of displays, each designed to handle a specific task. Secondarily,
SHARP also stores the results of some of its processing in log files and
databases. SHARP is not an autonomous system in that it takes no control
actions of its own. A human is "in the loop" at all times.
The displays of SHARP provide access to data resident in the system,
provide an interface to allow the operator to change that data when
appropriate, and dynamically indicate alarms and what systems are
affected by them. The displays are summarized in Figure 2-3 and the text
that follows. A more detailed description of the displays can be found in
Section 5.
Display Name
Alarm Warnings
Attitude and Articulation Control
Block Diagrams
Channelized Data Plots
Fast Fourier Transform
Link Status
Alarm Meters
Alarm Limit Tables
Integrated Sequence of Events
Channelized Data Monitoring
Predicts
Alarm History
Functionality
Indicate System Status
and Alarm Conditions
Display Data and Accept
User Modifications
Show Data or SHARP
Status Information
Figure 2-3 SHARP Displays
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Alarm History
This is a scrolling text display that shows all warnings given by
SHARP during a session.
Alarm Limit Tables
This is a tabular display that presents the operator with the values
of the alarm limits. The operator can modify alarm limits and
other parameters using this interface.
Alarm Meters ......
This display is a collection of meters that shows which channels
are currently in alarm, and gives the time of the last data value
that caused the alarm.
Alarm Warnings
This is not actually a display, but a pop-up window that will
appear whenever a warning message is given. This window will
appear regardless of the primary SHARP display being viewed by
the operator.
Attitude and Articulation Control
This display combines spacecraft motion parameters (pitch, yaw,
and roll) and records spacecraft movement over time in an iconic
display of spacecraft attitude.
Block Diagrams
This collection of displays based upon functional schematic block
diagrams allows the user to view the current, instantaneous
operational state of components of the communication path from
the spacecraft through the DSSs.
Channelized Data Monitoring
This display is primarily for the SHARP system implementors to
allow them to examine activity regarding the real-time data
acquisition and database transactions.
Channelized Data Plots
This collection of displays gives graphical views of the collected
real-time channelized data plotted in a variety of formats.
Fast Fourier Transform
This display shows the result of a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
computation on a selected engineering data channel. An FFT is
computed on the data values of a real-time data channel of the
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signal strength of the spacecraft transmissions received by a DSS.
By being able to examine the relative magnitude of one component
of this FFT, the SHARP system helps to determine when there is an
antenna pointing problem at the DSS that is tracing the spacecraft.
Integrated Sequence of Events
This display allows the operators to search for and review
summaries of selected events from the Integrated Sequence of
Events (ISOE) that affect telecom operations. It also allows them
to update the SHARP ISOE database to reflect the actual real-time
commands sent to the spacecraft.
Link Status
This display shows DSS antenna assignments, uplink and downlink
transmissions, and data rates for those transmissions. This
display also helps the operators to predict when data quality may
be degraded. In contrast to the block diagrams which show the
instantaneous status, the Link Status display shows status over
time.
Predicts
This display presents the predict information to the operator in a
tabular form, and shows DSS view periods for the spacecraft in a
graphical time-line format.
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3. Inputs to SHARP
This section describes in more detail the types of data used by the SHARP
system during the Voyager encounter, which would also be typical of data
used for other subsystem and spacecraft applications. The previous
section provided a summary of these data sources.
Predicts and Integrated Sequence of Events (ISOE) data were generated by
other computer programs at JPL. Both the Predicts and the ISOE were
available as ASCII format files. The Predicts covered a time period of six
months. The ISOE data covered a period of one week. These were
periodically retrieved when made available and processed for
incorporation into SHARP databases.
The Alarm Limits and Diagnostic Rules were generated using information
provided by the domain expert. The Channelized Data was retrieved and
analyzed in real time.
3.1. Predicts
Predicts are numerical predictions of acceptable threshold values for
particular spacecraft and DSS parameters that impact the performance of
the telecommunications link, such as signal-to-noise ratio and antenna
elevation angle. These predictions are generated for each spacecraft pass
over each ground station, and can be divided into four categories: raw
predicts, pass predicts, instantaneous predicts, and residual calculations.
In the present telecom monitoring environment, much of the predict
calculation process is performed manually, and is both tedious and time
consuming. SHARP stores the raw predicts in a database and generates
the other predict information as needed in real time. Figure 3-1 gives an
overview of the Predicts module within SHARP.
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3.1.1. Raw Predicts
Raw predicts are static values which are calculated from spacecraft and
DSS information. They are generated on an institutional Univac by a
program called Telecommunications Performance Analysis Program
(TPAP) using the following information:
• DSS center trajectory (STATRAJ) data, such as range and elevation
angle. This information is derived by the Navigation team, stored on
tape, and accessed for TPAP input by telecom personnel.
• Telecommunications link database information, i.e., static
spacecraft and DSN parameters. This information evolves over time
through such procedures as trend analysis.
• User input from telecom personnel, such as time, stations, and
power levels. This information dictates the constraints for each
TPAP run. For example, the user may request raw predict data for
station 14 from Jan 1 Mar 1 at high power.
Raw predicts files are generated for each antenna at a given power level
for a specified number of days (typically 90, 120, 180, etc.). These files
contain predict information per hour for each conceivable time period that
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the antenna can track Voyager 1 or Voyager 2 (per half hour during
planetary encounters). The predict files are currently available to the
telecommunications personnel in hardcopy form only, and are divided
according to antenna size, type, and location as shown in Figure 3-2.
Antenna Antenna DSS Number
Spacecraft Size Type & Location
Voyager 1
32 / 34 Meter
Voyager 2
70 Meter
HEF
(High Efficiency)
TRK
(Tracking)
i _ 15 Goldstone
F...._ 6_ CanberraMadrid
/ 12 Goldstone
__ 42 Canberra61 Madrid
14 Goldstone
43 Canberra
63 Madrid
Figure 3-2 DSS Antennas
When the TPAP predict files are generated for the Voyager Spacecraft
Team, the information is transferred via ethernet (using a TCP/IP based
FTP utility) to the SHARP system. SHARP's raw predicts parser then
processes these files and extracts the raw predicts for the predicts
database.
Appendix A, Predicts, contains more information on the parsing of the raw
predicts and how the other predict types are generated.
3.1.2, Pass Predicts
Pass predicts are raw prediction values tailored to a specific spacecraft
pass, a viewing period of a spacecraft by a DSS. The current method of
generating pass predicts involves searching the large hardcopy listings of
raw predicts to find the correct spacecraft, station, time, and radio-
frequency subsystem (RFS) mode. Predicts are then manually generated
using a hand calculator to reflect the actual spacecraft state, and the
results are manually recorded on a data sheet.
The tedious manual process for pass predict generation may take up to
two hours each day, and limits calculations to one pass predict point per
hour. Actual link parameters may be received every 15 seconds, leaving
quite a disparity between the desired number of predictions and the
incoming data.
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Since the SHARP system maintains the raw predicts on-line, pass predicts
can be automatically generated and interpolated to create values at 15-
second intervals. All calculations are easily performed in real time and,
therefore, are not stored in a database.
3.1.3. Instantaneous Predicts
Instantaneous predicts are pass predicts corrected in real time for actual
spacecraft and DSS behavior, such as spacecraft pointing loss and DSS
system noise temperature. The process of adjusting pass predicts is
known as predict correction, or instantaneous predict generation. Some
"instantaneous" predicts require no real-time adjustments, but are simply
the pass predict values. Instantaneous predicts are the final predict
values which are actually compared to the real data (in the form of
residual calculations).
Instantaneous predicts are computed in real time within the SHARP
system using the interpolated pass predict values. Again, these
calculations are not stored in a database.
3.1.4. Residuals
Spacecraft and DSS residuals are difference measurements between
actual telemetry values and their corresponding predicted values. Ideally,
this calculation should always be 0, meaning that there is no difference
between the values that were expected and the values that were actually
observed.
Residual calculations are currently performed manually in real time at
hourly intervals. These calculations are also performed by the Voyager
Telecommunications On-line Processing System (VTOPS) program on a
personal computer in the Voyager non-real-time telecom area. Residuals
are examined by the computer and anomalies are flagged.
Residuals are aut0matically derived in real time by the SHARP system at
15-second intervals. Not only are the values alarmed, but they may be
plotted as well for easy visual reference.
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3.2. Integrated Sequence of Events
The Integrated Sequence of Events (ISOE) is a schedule of spacecraft
activity integrated with corresponding tracking activity at the DSSs. ISOE
data are used extensively throughout the spacecraft monitoring process: in
prediction calculations, alarm determination, and anomaly diagnosis•
The SHARP system addresses the need to process ISOE data by acquiring
ISOE information for on-line storage, processing, and viewing. Figure 3-3
shows the overall structure of SHARP's ISOE module.
• Command Files
• DSN Schedule Changes
i non.real-time
Raw ISOE
(Orlglnsl Date)
• E RTB=6_82090322X
.(41330) X-BD TMU STATE
CHANGE,CC3A,D --,, 12741:2"3:
001F,,, MDS,2,8g-282/04:48:48
Stripped ISOE
(Cemmsnde)
• AC7PAR {6741 0Ot700)
• SC0eSB (25 0 (_ 0)
• DC_R
• Etc
Translated ISOE
{Commend Effects)
• Station * Mod Index
• S,'C .RTLT
• Data Rate • Deaclband
• Etc
Editable ISOE
INTERFACE
Add
Delete
Modify
SurllmalIze
Save
Test
Figure 3-3 ISOE Module
In the current Voyager real-time operational environment, the Voyager
ISOE, in hardcopy form (Figure 3-4), is visually scanned by the real-time
operator, and telecom events manually highlighted so that pertinent
telecom activity can be monitored. Modifications are made to an ISOE by
issuing handwritten correction sheets to supplement the original listing
(Figure 3-5).
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Figure 3-4 Sample Page of Voyager ISOE
//
Figure 3-5 Sample Page of ISOE Corrections
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The current method of handling Voyager ISOEs prompts several
complications. During periods of heightened activity, such as a planetary
encounter, it is possible for a single telecom event to be embedded among
several pages of another subsystem's events in the ISOE. It is easy to
overlook events, and sometimes the ISOE is so extensive that operators do
not even attempt to scan it. Rather, they rely on an unofficial graphical
sequence hardcopied product, the Spacecraft Flight Operations Schedule
(SFOS), to monitor critical events (Figure 3-6). Such use of the SFOS,
which is manually highlighted with a marker to indicate changes, creates
problems when users unknowingly do not reference the latest activity
modifications.
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Figure 3-6 Sample Page of Spacecraft Flight Operations Schedule
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The processing done by SHARP on the ISOE can be divided into five general
areas for discussion:
• acquiring the unabridged ISOE,
• reducing its content with the telecom stripper,
• modifying the stripper output with the translation parser,
• storing and accessing information in the ISOE database, and
• operator interaction with the ISOE user interface.
The first four areas will be covered in this section.
will be described in a later section.
The user interface
3.2.1. Unabridged ISOE
The unabridged ISOE files are text files that contain the complete time-
ordered sequence of spacecraft and DSS activities. An ISOE file is
generated approximately weekly by a program that resides on an
institutional Univac computer and is maintained by the Space Flight
Operations Section of JPL. The files for January 1989 through August
1989 varied in length from 90 kilobytes to 2 megabytes. These ISOE files
form the basis for the subsequent subsystem stripper program. Figure 3-7
illustrates an unabridged ISOE file.
The parsing of the unabridged ISOE files and the generation of the ISOE
database is a two-step process. First an intermediate text file is
produced containing the subsystem (e.g., telecom) events that have been
extracted from each ISOE file. Each event has also had extraneous
information eliminated from it. After this intermediate text file is
generated, the second step converts the text file to a computer readable
file which contains the events sorted by time and by event type. The
intermediate text file, also referred to here as the stripped ISOE, is
available for display and editing by the telecom operators.
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CN
N
N
N
ERTB=89136194145X
C
N
N
ERTB=89136194145X
C
ERTB=89136194145X
C
ERTB=89136194145X
C
ERTB=89136194558X
C
SCEA=89136200518T
ERTB=89136193946X ,, (7220) MISC LOGIC CNTL _M DUMP,AC7MLD,,, 8374:59:
C 602F,,,AACS,2,89-136/15:42:I2
ERTB=89136193956X ,, (03 I 09 0) FDS MODE TO: GS-4A, SC06BB, D---,, 837
C 5:00:009F,,,FDS, 2,89-136/15:42:24
N ,,PLS INTEGRATION MODE: N/A
N ,,PPS SAFING CO[_MAND : N/A
N ,,ENGINEERING FORMAT ENCOUNTER
N ,,AACS READOUT MODE : TELEMETRY
ERTB=89136194045X ACE OPCH,, [[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[)])]]]]]]]]]]]]],,D---,,
8375:01:001F,GS-4A,,FDS,2,89-136/15:43:I2,FDS,
FDS STATUS
,,GS-4A/X4.8K/S40
,,MEM:PB/FDS09 SA/FDSI8
,,[[[[[[[[[[l[[[[[]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]
,,---C,,,,,AACS, 2,,w
89-136/15:44:11
,,SLEW: > MARK 509
,,XXXXXXX B- SLEW : 5.1 XXXXXXXX,,,,08375:02:218F,,,
,2,89-136/15:44:13
,,(I 12 2 083 077) EL SLEW R=LOW, AC7SPK,,, 8375:02:2
19F,,,AACS, 2,89-136/15:44:I3
,, (2 12 2 173 127) AZ SLEW R=LOW, AC7SPK,,, 8375:02:2
20F,,,AACS,2,89-136/15:44:I3
,,EL=155.131 AZ=231.I13 TS=30SEC,SLEWEND,,,08375:07:
424F .... 2,89-136/15:48:25
,,VGR-31 OWLT IS 5H 6M 0S,,D---,,,,,,I
TR_=89136214500X ACE OPCH,,<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>,,D---,,,
C
N
N
TRMB=89136214500X
C
TRMB=BgI36214935X
SCEB=89136221250X
TR_=89136232841X
TRMB=89136234500X
C
TRMB=89136234804X
TRMA=89137011500T
C
SCEA=89137014236T
TRMA=89137022941T
ERTB=89137035734X
C
N
N
N
N
N
N
,,,2,,ARRE, 43,49,,,
,, END DSS-43/49 ARRAY PASS
,,<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
OPCH ACE,, LOS DSS-49 PASS-4299 ,,D---,49
LOS,,,,,2,,LOS,
,, SET DSS-49,,,49 SET,,,,,2,
,,VGR-32 OWLT IS 3H 57M 34S,,D---,,,,,,2,
,, STATION I0 DEG ELEVATION POINT ,,D---,43,,,,,2
OPCH ACE,, LOS DSS-43 PASS-4299 ,,D---,43
LOS,,,,,2,,LOS,
,, SET DSS-43,,,43 SET,,,,,2,
OPCH ACE,, AOS DSS-61 PASS-4283 (D/L ONLY),,D---,61
AOS,,,,,I,,AOS, 18,
,,VGR-31 OWLT IS 5H 6M IS,,D---,,,,,,I
,, RISE DSS-15,,,15RISE,,,,,I
OPCH ACE,,÷++++++++++++÷++++++++++++++++++,,D---,,0
8385:22:005F,GS4A,,RFS, 2,89-137/00:00:00
,, RFS STAGS
,, TWNC = OFF <--> FDS MODE = GS4A
,,S-BD PWR = ON X-BD PWR = HI
,, RNG = OFF RNG = ON
,, M.I.= 28 M.I.= 41
,,++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Figure 3-7 Section of an Unabridged ISOE File
3.2.2. Telecommunication Events Stripper
A generic capability to extract subsystem-specific information was
developed so that telecom-specific events, or any other subsystem events,
could be stripped from the ISOE. This information could later be displayed
to enable rapid identification of significant activities to be monitored
during any particular pass. The telecom event stripper gathers from the
unabridged ISOE file only that information which is critical to
telecommunications analysis. This automated process replaces the task
of manually highlighting the embedded telecom events.
Initially the stripper program was developed in BASIC on the Univac where
the ISOE resides. It would strip out telecom data based on keyword
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identification. The result, a stripped ISOE file, was then transferred to
the Symbolics development machine via a modem connection. Eventually, a
method was developed to transfer the entire ISOE to the Symbolics
machine via Ethernet (using TCP/IP FTP), and the Univac BASIC stripper
program was rewritten in LISP on the Symbolics. Obtaining ISOE data
directly made the ISOE module easier to maintain and manipulate. Figure
3-8 gives an example of the output of the stripper program. This is the
output that would have been generated if the information of Figure 3-7
were used as the input. This example shows the amount of the ISOE data
that is eliminated that is not needed for telecommunications analysis.
0277 136 19 39 56 SC06BB (03 1 09 0)
0278 136 19 40 45 FDS GS4A 4.8K $40
0286 136 21 45 00 LOS 49
0290 136 23 45 00 LOS 43
0295 137 03 57 34 RFS OFF GS4A ON OFF 28 HIGH ON 41 3 57 34
Figure 3-8 Section of a Stripped ISOE File
3.2.3. Translation Parser
As illustrated in Figures 3-7 and 3-8, the ISOE data appears in a
somewhat obscure form. However, each ISOE command represents a
specific DSS or spacecraft activity. The Voyager commands list contains
all spacecraft commands and their corresponding translation. SHARP's
translation parser uses this commands list to translate the spacecraft
commands from their original form into annotated summaries of
spacecraft activity. In addition to direct translation, the parser also
includes information about DSS events and information about the impact
of each command, e.g., when telemetry data will be lost or degraded.
The output of the translator are LISP files that form the basis for
SHARP's ISOE database. A sample of the output of the translator is shown
in Figure 3-9.
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;Parsed SOE.
(...
(277 #. (CreateTime 136 19 39 56) SC06BB (3 1 9 0))
(278 #. (CreateTime 136 19 40 45) FDS (GS4A 4.8K S40))
(286 #. (CreateTime 136 21 45 0) LOS 49)
(290 #. (CreateTime 136 23 45 0) LOS 43)
(295 J.(CreateTime 137 3 57 34)
RFS (OFF GS4A ON OFF 28 HIGH ON 41 #. (CreateTime 0 3 57 34)))
; Translated SOE.
(...
(43 (:LOS (#.(CreateTlme 135 23 50 0) . 43)
(#. (CreateTime 136 23 45 0) . 43) ...)
(:AOS (#. (CreateTlme 135 12 50 0) . 43) ...))
...)
(:SC (:DTRMODE (#. (CreateTime 138 ii 38 44) . :READY) ...)
(:XBDDRIVER2 (#. (CreateTime 138 7 31 7) . :ON) ...)
(:XBDDRIVERI (#.(CreateTlme 138 7 31 7) . :ON) ...)
(:SUBCARFREQ&DATARATE (#. (CreateTime 138 7 31 7) . :NORMAL) ...)
(:XBDDATALINE (#. (CreateTlme 138 7 31 7) . :HIGHRATE) . ..)
(:XBDSUBCARRIERFREQUENCY (#. (CreateTime 138 7 31 7) . :HIGH) ...)
(:XBDMODINDEX ... {#. (CreateTlme 137 3 57 34) . 41) ...)
(:XBDRNG ... (#.(CreateTime 137 3 57 34) . :ON) ...)
(:XBDXMTLEVEL ... (#. (CreateTime 137 3 57 34) . :HIGH) ...)
(:SBDMODINDEX ... (#. (CreateTime 137 3 57 34) . 28) ...)
(:SBDRNG ... (#.(CreateTime 137 3 57 34) . :OFF) ...)
(:SBDXMTPWR ... (#. (CreateTime 137 3 57 34) . :ON) ...)
( :DATAMODE ...
(#.(CreateT_me 136 19 40 45) . :GS4A)
(#.(CreateTime 137 3 57 34) . :GS4A) ...)
(:TWNC ... (#.(CreateTime 137 3 57 34) . :OFF) ...))))
Figure 3-9 Sample Output of ISOE Translator Program
3.2.4. ISOE Database
The SHARP ISOE database contains the translated ISOE information, time-
tagged and indexed as DSS or spacecraft events. Each event is further
indexed and contains a list of associated time-value pairs.
This allows the user to index and retrieve the various individual states of
the spacecraft based upon state type, time, spacecraft ID, and receiving
station. This translated form of the data is used by all other modules in
the SHARP system.
At any given moment in time, SHARP usually has thousands of lines of
translated ISOE data loaded. This data must be searched at least seven
times for every telemetry value received and every point plotted. The
diagnostician may require this data to be searched hundreds of times for a
typical diagnosis.
The state of the spacecraft changes very slowly over time. Some states
have not changed for years. Searching years worth of ISOEs would be
impossible to do and also maintain real-time processing of all data. This
required a cache to be added to the facilities of the ISOE database.
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The ISOE cache allows the incremental adding and deleting of facts to the
ISOE database without reparsing any more than the minimal set of ISOE
database lines in order to determine the new state of the spacecraft.
The ISOE cache has changed the average accessing time from an uncached
ISOE request from four seconds to 600 microseconds.
3.3. Channelized Data
The third data input to SHARP, channelized data, includes real-time
telemetry data from the spacecraft, tracking stations, and other relevant
systems. It is collected and distributed by JPL computers, including
elements of the DSN, the Ground Communication Facility (GCF), the Mission
Control and Command Center (MCCC), and the Voyager Test and Telemetry
System (TTS). The telemetry data is separated into channels, each
containing information regarding a single system, subsystem, or
component. The channelized data gives the values of hundreds of
spacecraft engineering status parameters and station performance
parameters. The data channels giving the spacecraft status are called
engineering channels; the channels giving the DSN parameters are called
the monitor channels. For the Voyager telecom application, SHARP
processed just over 100 engineering and monitor channels.
Within SHARP, the channelized data is stored in a database as it is
received. Also functions are automatically executed upon the receipt of
the data so that an analysis of the newly acquired data can occur. Several
of the functional modules of SHARP use this data and access it through the
database (Figure 3-10). In the current telecom environment, the channels
are plotted on black-and-white video terminals and are visually monitored
to ensure that they remain within their prespecified limits.
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INTERFACE
• Datavs. Time Plots
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..... r ....... "
Other Interface Modules
Block Diagrams
Link Status
Attitude Plot ..... :...:. .................
Alarm Limits Module
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" Determination
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Module
==
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FFT for Conscen Error
Figure 3-10 Channelized Database and Clients
3.3.1. Data Source
During the Voyager encounter, SHARP's real-time data source for
telemetry data was an RS-232 data connection from the Voyager TTS
computer. This was the same data that was sent to a line printer located
in the Voyager real-time monitoring area. The data was received as ASCII
text.
Figure 3-11 gives an example of the format of the received channelized
data. The first two lines are a header line which was received each time a
new page of data was output to the line printer. The only datum that was
extracted from this line was the number of the day. Each of the remaining
lines gave the channel number, the time (hours, minutes, seconds, and
milliseconds), an abbreviated name for the data channel, and three
columns of data. The first data column displays the data in engineering
units. This is derived from the second column which is formatted in data
units. The final column shows the amount of change in the data units from
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the previous receipt of data on that channel.
contained in the second data column.
SHARP uses the values
SC32 52801.41 H-63 ITR=40 F CE-40 UNDEF W-
PB= DAY 160 P El5 PAGE 604
ITR= F NONE
EI-025 00.33.17.085
EI-i46 00.33.17.085
EI-168 00.33.29.085
M-776 00.33.59.798
RCVAGC -9916-02 0
FDS M WD 0000E 000016
FDS INDEX 45
XMTPWR 50
0
000321
1
2
Figure 3-11 Sample of Channelized Data
3.3.2. Acquiring Channelized Data
To acquire the channelized data, several tasks must be performed:
establish a connection to the real-time data source, monitor the status of
the data source for communication failures, automatically reconnect back
to the data source in the event of a communication failure, and parse,
extract, and store the ASCII data as channelized time/value pairs. These
tasks are all managed automatically by the SHARP system.
3.3.3. Database Indexer and Retriever
This module includes one of the central databases for SHARP.
following capabilities:
It has the
• to dynamically create new areas in which to store data for a
channel,
• to expunge all data associated with a channel,
• to add new data for a channel indexed by spacecraft time,
• to retrieve data indexed by spacecraft time,
• to delete individual values from a channel's database,
• to search for data based upon a channel, and
• to enumerate the data of a channel over some time interval.
Database daemons have been constructed to implement spontaneous
computations. The daemons analyze the incoming data and activate
function calls, such as requests to plot the data or to determine if the
data indicates an alarm condition. Requests can be made to the database
to trigger arbitrary activities when a complex combination of past,
present, and future events occur. A wide selection of retrieval methods
by time or value highlight the flexibility inherent in the database.
Requests to the database can be handled serially or in parallel.
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3.3.4. Database Partitioning
The central database breaks data for each channel into files that partition
the data into four-hour chunks. Partitioning is required to keep empty
areas in the database, time intervals where no data is stored, small.
Since data is stored with a resolution of one second, for any one year
there could be as many as 31,622,400 separate data values for each of the
approximately 100 telemetry channels that SHARP monitors.
3.3.5. Database Open Status Reducer
While SHARP is running, it opens many partitions of the central database
to access the data. There may be multiple partitions open at any one time
as the different modules within SHARP may each be needing data. These
partitions are left open after they are used because they may be accessed
soon again and it is a costly operation to open a partition of the database.
As a result, at any given moment there may be many partitions opened that
have not been accessed for a long time.
The open status reducer will close off those partitions not accessed and
free up any internal storage that has been allocated. Partitions that have
not been accessed for 30 minutes are closed automatically.
In addition to closing partitions that have not been recently accessed,
SHARP will only open a maximum of 20 partitions at any given time. Here
again the least recently accessed and oldest partition will be closed to
make room for a new partition that needs to be opened.
3.3.6. Automatic Database Archival and Size Reduction Module
This module scans all the telemetry channels of the database and deletes
and expunges all data that are older than a certain number of days, where
the number is easily set by an applications programmer. Currently data
older than 14 days are eliminated. This is done to regain free space on the
hard disk. It is assumed that data older than 14 days are not needed for
real-time analysis, but could be retrieved from tape archives if necessary.
3.3.7. Daemon Pattern Matcher
This module allows one to associate one or more functions to be applied
on the arrival of new real-time data or archived data for some time
interval. When that time interval has expired, the daemon will
automatically terminate.
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This functionality is used:
• in the diagnostician to monitor the arrival of new data,
• in the channelized data plotter to plot new data as it arrives,
• in the link status module to perform its computations incrementally
as the data arrives, and
• in the FFT module for the computation of scan errors based on
certain channels.
3.4. Alarm Limits
The fourth data used within SHARP are the alarm limits.
Each time any data on a real-time channel are received by SHARP, the
value of the data must be tested to determine if it may signal an alarm
condition. These alarms suggest problems with the spacecraft and/or
other parts of the telecommunication paths. Critical to the
telecommunications link analysis are alarm limits, the threshold values
for spacecraft and DSS performance measurements against which the
channelized data are compared. These alarm limit values are selected
according to the status of several parameters, such as the state of the
spacecraft instruments and spacecraft events.
In the current telecommunications environment, however, the process to
change these alarm limits is manual and must be performed in real time.
The procedure is so burdensome, and occurs so often, that typically a wide
threshold is selected that incorporates the entire range of parameter
conditions that reflect the various spacecraft states. This creates a
situation that increases the risk of undetected anomalies.
Broadened alarm limits present obvious complications. If, in fact, a
component is in alarm within the broadened range, this condition may go
undetected. Alternatively, alarm limits could be set to a narrower range
that would be appropriate for the most common spacecraft state.
However, when the spacecraft was placed into a different state, false
alarms would be triggered by valid data that was outside of those limits.
One advantage of the SHARP system is its capability to use variable,
dynamically selected alarm limits when examining the real-time
channelized data. As the configuration of the spacecraft changes, the
nominal ' limits on the real-time data received from the spacecraft are
also changing. These alarm limits are stored into tables. Using both ISOE
and channelized data, SHARP automatically computes which of the limits
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to use for real-time alarm determination.
Section 4.2.1.
This is discussed more fully in
3.4.1. Alarm Limit Tables
There are three types of alarm tables in SHARP: (1) tables for the Monitor
channels which contain alarm limits for the ground station parameters,
(2) tables for the Engineering channels which contain alarm limits for the
spacecraft parameters, and (3) tables for the Predict Residual
calculations. The values contained within these tables were specified by
the domain expert, and reflect his judgement as well as the conventions
accepted by the flight project.
These tables are accessible by the telecom operators in an editable
format. This provides them a means to change the limits when warranted
by changes in spacecraft or DSS operations or performance.
Other information is contained within the alarm tables in addition to the
alarm limits. This includes a string for an abbreviated name for the
channel, a list of the inclusive range of values within which the data are
not in alarm, a list of the low and high limit values for hard alarms, a list
of the default values for the low and high limits when plotting, and finally
a string for arbitrary comments. There are exceptions to this format. An
example of a portion of an alarm table is shown in Figure 3-12. The
details of this table are also discussed in Section 4.2.1.
( (:XBDXMTLEVEL :HIGH
:SBDXMTPWR :ON
:SBDXMTLEVEL :LOW
:SBDXMTSELECT :SSA
:TWNC :OFF
:SCAGCLOCK :IN)
(E-020 "RFS ST1" (146 146) E-020-Rfs-Status-l-Alarm-Test NIL "No Plot")
(E-021 "RFS ST2" (207 207) E-021-RFS-Status-2-Alarm-Test NIL "No Plot")
(E-022 "VCO C V" NIL NIL NIL "Dead; Not alarmed.")
(E-023 "VCO F V" (130 131) (129 132) (125 135))
iE-041 "X RFM T" (154 167) (152 169) (150 175))
• • ,)
Figure 3-12 Portion of an Alarm Limit Table
3.5. Rules
The fifth data contained within SHARP are the rules.
places where rules are used.
There are three
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3.5.1. Displaying System Status Rules
The first rules are found in the module that determines how to display the
status of the spacecraft and ground station systems, subsystems, and
components. Using information from the ISOE and the channelized data,
SHARP computes the operating state of the components along the
telecommunications path. A component could be turned on or off. Also, a
component could be in alarm or not. This information is used to color the
component or the system of which it is part in the appropriate block
diagrams.
Information obtained from the domain expert was gathered into
statements that described the parameters upon which the status of each
component depended. For example, within the telecommunications block
diagram description, the statement for the status of the Auxiliary
Oscillator No. 1 appears in Figure 3-13.
10. AuxOscl
Turns GREEN when Uso = Off and SbdExcSelect = 1
Turns WHITE when Uso = On or
Uso = Off and SbdExcSelect = 2
Turns RED/YELLOW when Sbd Exc 1 in alarm [E-034, E-050]
Figure 3-13 Statement of a Rule for Updating a Display Component
There are approximately 250 such statements that have been encoded into
SHARP. They were encoded into two modules. The aspects of the rules
that give information concerning the nominal operating state of the
component (whether it is green for indicating it is on or white for off)
were placed in the process that updates the block diagrams. The aspect
that controls whether the display is to show an alarm state (red or
yellow) was placed in the diagnostician module of SHARP.
3.5.2. Channelized Data Error Rules
The second type of rule determines whether or not the nominal operating
state of a component corresponds to the actual state of the component. If
not, then an error condition exists. Some of these determinations do not
need rules but only simple numerical checks as described in the Section
4.2. However, for a number of components, more reasoning is required to
understand their correct operating behavior. This knowledge is encoded
within the special alarm functions that were discussed in the previous
section. An example of one of these rules is shown in Figure 3-14.
3-i 8
For Bit 5 (Sbd SSA Pwr) of Channel E-020 (RFS Status 1):
If Bit 5 = 0 (Off) and
Channel E-021 (RFS Status 2) Bit 3 (Sbd TWTA) = 0 (Off)
Then SbdXmtPwr should be off.
(Hard alarm if ISOE SbdXmtPwr differs)
If Bit 5 = 0 (Off) and
Channel E-021 (RFS Status 2) Bit 3 (Sbd TWTA) -- 1 (On)
Then SbdXmtPwr should be On and
SbdXmtSelect should be TWTA.
(Hard alarm if ISOE SbdXmtPwr or SbdXmtSelect differ)
If Bit 5 = 1 (On)
Then SbdXmtPwr should be On and
SbdXmtSelect should be SSA.
(Hard alarm if ISOE SbdXmtPwr or SbdXmtSelect differ)
Figure 3-14 Statement of a Rule for Determining Component State
This rule is contained within the processing that is done on data for
channel E-020. There are approximately 62 such rules for all of the
specialized alarm functions.
3.5.3. Diagnostic Rules
The final type of rules are used in diagnosing and hypothesizing the cause
of error conditions. This aspect of SHARP is both the most difficult to
implement and potentially the most rewarding as it requires the most
detailed knowledge of the domain expert.
The process of acquiring the information from the domain expert required
several iterations for many of the rules. The knowledge engineer of
SHARP would interview the expert, and would then consolidate the notes
from the interview into a flow chart or decision tree, a procedural
representation easily understood by the domain expert. The expert would
then review that and make deletions, modifications, or additions where
appropriate. One important lesson learned from this exercise is that
knowledge acquisition is a laborious task, even with the extremely
cooperative domain expert who worked with the SHARP development team.
An example of one of the flowcharts is given in the Figure 3-15. There
were approximately 20 rules that were encoded from similar flowcharts.
These flowcharts were translated into a combination of rules for
implementing the inferencing aspects and LISP code for implementing the
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algorithmic aspects.
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Figure 3-15 An Example of a Diagnostic Flowchart
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4. Processing within SHARP
The processing within SHARP includes:
data collection and display,
automation of manual tasks done by telecommunication operators,
alarm detection and diagnosis,
specialized analysis of data, and
user interface operations.
The primary focus of this section will be alarm determination and the way
SHARP responds to alarms. Also, the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
specialized analysis feature will be described. The means used to collect
the data were covered in the previous section. The next section will
discuss the displays and user interface.
4.1. Motivation for Telecommunication System Automation
When a spacecraft or DSS parameter goes into alarm, the cause must be
determined. Within the current telecommunications monitoring system,
the condition can often be a false alarm caused by inaccuracies
precipitated by the limitations of the current system. In other instances,
the alarm exists because of common problems that occur on a frequent
basis, and therefore, these types of alarms are easily resolved. For actual
spacecraft problems, such as the failed radio receiver, hundreds of people
must be notified and put on alert to solve the emergency. Regardless of
the cause or the severity of an alarm, a standard set of rules is routinely
followed to determine the basis of the problems. Unfortunately,
knowledge of these rules resides with a select few, and the first rule of
the standard procedure is to consult the expert, even when the situation
arises from a known false alarm.
The SHARP system automates much of the process of telecommunications
diagnosis. By improving the monitoring process and correcting some of
the inaccuracies of the current system, SHARP attempts to produce far
fewer false alarms and reduce the mundane procedures required in
handling the known common problems. When alarm conditions arise from
any monitoring procedure within the SHARP system, such as channels in
alarm, link status problems, antenna tracking errors, or attitude alarms,
the information is automatically passed to the diagnostician to determine
all possible causes for the anomaly.
Automating fault detection and diagnosis facilitates quicker response
times to mission anomalies and more accurate conclusions. A second
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important benefit generated by the programming task to build this
automation is the permanent record of expert knowledge in handling
common as well as difficult and unusual problems.
4.2. Artificial Intelligence Diagnosis
The automation of fault detection and diagnosis is accomplished though
the use of artificial intelligence (AI) programming techniques. The AI
modules of SHARP are written in an expert system building language
called STAR*TOOL, which is a programming language designed at JPL for
use in the development of AI applications. Appendix C contains a
description of the STAR*TOOL system.
AI techniques are distributed throughout all components of the SHARP
system. Intelligent programming methodologies such as heuristic
adaptive parsing, truth maintenance, and expert system technology enable
more effective automation and thorough analysis for SHARP functions.
Fault detection becomes almost immediate with a high degree of accuracy
and precision, and the system quickly generates fault hypotheses. The
structure of SHARP's AI module is illustrated in Figure 4-1. The
following paragraphs highlight some of the principle AI concepts used in
SHARP's diagnostic module. These concepts are described in detail in the
general AI literature.
A blackboard architecture, provided by STAR*TOOL, serves as a uniform
framework for communication within the heterogeneous multiprocess
environment in which SHARP operates. Generally, when two or more
processes are cooperating, they must interact in a manner more
complicated than simply setting global variables. For example, they may
need to add information to queues or share diagnostic context trees. The
SHARP blackboard provides a standardized method of communication
between multiple processes.
The diagnostic component of SHARP is composed of a hierarchical
executive diagnostician coupled with cooperating and noncooperating
mini-experts. Each mini-expert is responsible for the local diagnosis of a
specific fault or class of faults, such as particular channels in alarm,
antenna tracking conical scan errors, or loss of telemetry. A non-
cooperating expert focuses only on its designated fault area, but a
cooperating expert has the additional capability of searching beyond its
local area to identify related faults that are likely to occur. Cooperating
experts are used in situations where the identification of a particular
fault cannot be made by examining a single fault class alone.
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Figure 4-1 SHARP's AI Module
The executive diagnostician combines input propagated from each local
diagnostician and reviews the overall situation to propose one or more
fault hypotheses and recommended corrective actions. When multiple
fault hypotheses are generated, the system lists all possible causes of the
anomaly and ranks each according to plausibility.
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If one or more of the cooperating experts fails, the executive
diagnostician will continue to operate with only a reduction in the area of
local diagnosis that would have been derived from the failed mini-experts.
Similarly, if the executive diagnostician fails, the cooperating experts
will locally diagnose the faults in isolation of multiple fault
consideration.
The diagnostician is implemented in rules that execute in pseudo-parallel
in pursuit of multiple hypotheses. Pseudo-parallelism is implemented in
SHARP using facilities provided by STAR*TOOL, which includes
parallelism as a fundamental control structure. The diagnostic rules
operate in isolation of one another by executing in independent contexts
provided by the STAR*TOOL memory model, and communicate through the
Blackboard facility.
These contexts can be organized into a tree-like structure to represent
contradictory information resulting from changes in facts or from the
introduction of new or contradictory hypotheses. Facilities in the truth
maintenance system handle data- and demand-driven diagnoses to ensure
an appropriate balance between the persistence of hypotheses and
sensitivity to new data.
The truth maintenance system constantly monitors for violations of
logical consistency. For example, it performs conflict checking to
maintain consistency among multiple rule firings, hypotheses, and the
knowledge base, and allows the context-sensitive management of alarms
through a complex response system to combinations of alarm conditions.
Truth maintenance techniques also provide a variety of functions for
temporal reasoning in multiple fault diagnosis.
4.2.1. Alarm Determination Module
Upon the arrival of each channelized data value of real-time telemetry, it
is classified as to its state:
nominal, where the channelized data has an acceptable value,
soft alarm, in which case the operator should watch this channel
more closely and inform others on the spacecraft team of potential
problems, or
hard alarm, in which case science data or the spacecraft are in
jeopardy and the operator needs to inform others on the spacecraft
team of serious problems.
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To do this, SHARP invokes a function to check the datum against the
channel's alarm limits. Channels that carry information about the
condition of the spacecraft (engineering channels) may have alarm limits
that depend upon the state of the spacecraft which is changing over time.
Channels relaying information about the ground stations (monitor
channels) have fixed alarm tables that do not change over time.
In order to determine the proper alarm limits to use for comparison
against engineering channel data, SHARP examines the ISOE data and real-
time data from a specific engineering channel (E-025, Receiver AGC) to
determine the current state of the spacecraft. The conditions that define
the relevant spacecraft configurations for Voyager telecommunications
include:
Parameter
X-Band Transmitter Power Level
S-Band Transmitter Power Status
S-Band Transmitter Power Level
S-Band Transmitter Select
Two-way Non-coherent (TWNC) status
Automatic Gain Control (AGC) Lock status
Values
High/Low
On/Off
High/Low
SSA/TWTA
On/Off
In/Out
Given this information, a search is made through the alarm limit tables to
find the proper limits to use.
The first part of this table contains the state information for the
spacecraft. This is first checked to determine if the spacecraft state
matches the given values.
In the majority of cases, a simple numerical check is used to determine if
the data value for a channel is in alarm. In other cases, functions must be
called that perform other types of analysis.
For an example of a numerical limit, refer to Figure 4-2. For the channel
E-041, the data are expected to be 154 through 167. Data below 152 or
above 169 are considered to be a hard alarm. Data that are 153 (i.e.,
between 152 and 154) or 168 are in soft alarm. If this channel is plotted,
the default limit for the vertical scale is from 150 to 175.
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( (:XBDXMTLEVEL :HIGH
:SBDXMTPWR :ON
:SBDXMTLEVEL :LOW
:SBDXMTSELECT :SSA
:TWNC :OFF
:SCAGCLOCK :IN)
(E-020 "RFS ST1" (146 146) E-020-Rfs-Status-l-Alarm-Test NIL "No Plot")
(E-021 "RFS ST2" (207 207) E-021-RFS-Status-2-Alarm-Test NIL "No Plot")
(E-022 "VCO C V" NIL NIL NIL "Dead; Not alarmed.")
(E-023 "VCO F V" (130 131) (129 132) (125 135))
i_.'-041 "X RFM T" (154 167) (152 169) (150 175))
o, o)
Figure 4-2 Portion of an Alarm Limit Table
An example of a functional alarm test is shown for the channel E-020. If
the value of the received data is not 146, the function E-020-Rfs-Status-
1-Alarm-Test is called with the received value and the time it was
received. The data for this channel contain information about the
configuration of the spacecraft on a bit-by-bit basis. When a data value is
received, it must be compared against the ISOE data to determine if there
is an alarm condition. If there is an alarm condition, then this function
returns both the type of the alarm (soft or hard) and a description of the
alarm.
The channel E-022 is never considered to be in alarm because is has a NIL
(a LISP data value) where the alarm limits should be.
A channel may have its alarm limits designated by (0 NIL).
there is no upper limit for a hard alarm.
In this case,
The data for the channel E-025 must also be analyzed specially. Both the
state of the spacecraft and the range within which the data value lies
determine the results of its processing.
4.2.2. Alarm Executive
Once it has been determined that an alarm has occurred, the alarm
executive assumes responsibility. This module performs several
functions:
o If a channel is just going into alarm, notify the fault classifier of
the channel's name, time, value at the time of alarm, and any
initial hypothesis.
4-6
,,
.
o
°
°
.
.
If the Fault Classifier cannot locate any mini-expert rules that can
classify the fault, display an alarm condition message.
If the channel is already in alarm and the diagnosis for the current
alarmed value is the same as the last diagnosis for the channel,
then the new alarm has no additional effect.
If the severity of the alarm changes, i.e. from soft to hard or from
hard to soft, then notify the user of the change in status.
If the new data value is not in alarm and the channel's last value
was in alarm, then notify the user that the alarm condition for that
channel no longer exists. Also, update all the various SHARP
modules and displays to indicate that this channel is no longer in
alarm.
Update the alarm status display to show the total number of soft
and hard alarms. That display will also indicate when no alarms are
currently present.
Update the appropriate block diagrams if the channel is related to
one of the block diagram components. An example of a rule that
does this is shown in Figure 4-3.
Create a meter, displayed on the alarm meter window, that will
track and display all of the consecutively alarmed values. This
meter will automatically go away when the channel is no longer in
alarm.
Post the channel's state to the blackboard for use by other SHARP
modules.
(DefBlockRule SC-SbdExc.Driver (Channel Time Value)
:Channels (E-034 E-050)
:Alarm (COND
((AND (EQ Channel 'E-034)
(EQ (GetValueFromSoeOrDefault :SC :SbdExcPwr Time)
:On))
(UpdateBlockDiagramIcon))
((EQ (GetValueFromSoeOrDefault :SC :SbdExcPwr Time)
:Off)
(UpdateBlockDiagramIcon))))
Figure 4-3 Sample Rule for Updating a Block Diagram
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4.2.3. Fault Classifier
This module takes the spacecraft's current status as determined from the
integrated sequence of events and any initial hypothesis generated from
the alarm determination module, and asserts this information into the AI
database to start its rules. The rules of the fault classifier take this
information and determine which mini-expert rules can diagnose some
aspect of this alarm condition.
After all applicable mini-expert rules are determined, the mini-expert
Rule Interpreter is notified of the enabling set of mini-expert rules that
should be tried.
This module allows the mini-expert rules to be written in a far more
general manner. Each mini-expert rule does not have to specify all of the
various preconditions that might pertain. Instead the mini-expert rule can
contain only the information necessary to diagnose this type of problem
rather than needing, in addition, a mechanism for determining all possible
conditions that can cause this fault to occur.
4.2.4. Mini-Expert Rules
Rule definitions take the form of high-level descriptions of preconditions,
activation and execution contexts, spacecraft state descriptions, real-
time data, initial hypothesis, and diagnostic actions to be performed. Two
examples of such rules can be found in Figures 4-4 and 4-5.
A rule compiler takes the high-level rule descriptions and generates
Common LISP code from their descriptions. In addition, the rule compiler
generates the necessary bookkeeping code to link the rule into SHARP's
run-time rule environment. The run-time environment provides various
debugging facilities, the blackboard for global communication among
mini-experts, and other features.
Each rule is not required to diagnose a single fault. Many rules may
operate in cooperation by sharing information on the blackboard. The rules
locally diagnose their faults by posting their fault hypothesis on the
blackboard and having the various fault combiners group this information
into one or more conclusions.
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(DefMiniExpert E-025-EU (Channel Time Value)
:LocalVars ((tO
(Channel-Alarm-Limits Channel Time)))
(DiagnosticMessage "~A Alarm: Channel ~A is in alarm at time ~A.~2% ~
Source: S/C engineering data.~2% ~
Value: ~A~2% ~
Explanation: There is a ~A problem.~2% ~
Corrective Action: Advise ~A:~% ~
~A"
(GetAlarmTypeString DiagnosticianAlarmType T)
(GetFancyChannelName Channel)
Time
(AlarmPercentageText Value
t0@l
t0@2
(GetChannelDescription Channel))
(if (>= value -i00)
"spacec ra ft"
"t e lecommuni cat ions" )
(If (>= value -100)
"Spacecraft Team, Mission Control,
and Deep Space Station (PANIC!!!)"
"Mission Control and Deep Space Station")
DiagnosticianAlarmArg))
Figure 4-4 Sample of a Simple Mini-Expert Rule
(DefMiniExpert DetectSSNR-ResidualInAlarm (Alarm Time Value)
:Channel E-025
:LocalVars (tO)
(COND
((EngrDataPresentP 60.)
(Hypothesize 'TelmentryDataPresentForSSNR-ResidualInAlarm))
((Not (MonitorDataPresentP 30.))
(Hypothesize 'MonitorDataNotPresentForSSNR-ResidualInAlarm))
((OR (<= (SETQ tO (FindMinusTimeValue (If X-BandAGC-SourceHighSpeedFlag
'M-766
'M-769)
Time
T))
-1700.)
(>= tO -i000.))
(Hypothesize 'DSS-Rcvr0utOfLockForSSNR-ResidualInAlarm))))
Figure 4-5 Sample of an Inferencing Mini-Expert Rule
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4.2.5. Hypothesis Combiner
This module is implemented as rules and LISP code that trigger on
hypotheses that have been posted to the blackboard, it then combines
related hypotheses into a single more encompassing one, eliminates
redundant hypotheses, and generates multiple conclusions and ranks them
from multiple unrelated hypotheses.
4.2.6. Alarm Message Manager
When the diagnosis part of the processing has been completed, the user
must be informed about the results of that processing. The alarm message
manager module informs the user of an alarm by updating an alarm status
window and by displaying a message window giving the details of the
alarm.
In addition it provides two logs of all diagnosis messages, alarm
messages, error messages, status messages, or general notifications. One
log is to a scrollable color-coded history window and the other is a text
file that can be printed out on conventional printers. The text log file is
maintained even in the event of a software or hardware failure.
4.2.7. Initial Alarm Status Calculator
Whenever SHARP is started from a cold state, such as from system
booting, the current health of the spacecraft has to be determined based
upon what is last known and is currently being seen. To wait for a
complete set of real-time data to arrive in order to properly initialize
SHARP's current state could take hours. A special capability had to be
implemented to shorten this process.
This module analyzes the various SHARP databases, e.g. archived
channelized data, integrated sequence of events, raw predicts, and
instantaneous predicts, .....and initializes the diagnostician and all of
SHARP's blackboards to the current state of the spacecraft. This analysis
- is performed in parallel with the receiving of real-time data and as real-
time data replaces various assumed states based upon the last recorded
archived data, SHARP updates its states accordingly.
4-10
4.3. Fast Fourier Transform
Special processing modules to perform subsystem-specific analysis are
easily integrated with SHARP monitoring and diagnosis functions. For the
telecommunications subsystem, a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of the DSS
conical scanning component is performed to indicate when the antenna is
going off point.
Conical scanning (conscan) by the ground stations is a technique used to
maintain antenna tracking of the spacecraft. Instead of pointing the
antenna directly at the spacecraft, the antenna is moved slowly in a small
circle around the location. Ideally, the center of this antenna pointing
direction is on the spacecraft at all times. Periodically, however, the
antenna will begin drifting off target. This is a relatively common event,
which currently may take a significant amount of time to detect and
correct. Both spacecraft and scientific information can be permanently
lost when this situation occurs.
SHARP calculates an FFT on data from the channel currently designated as
the relevant AGC channel. A DSS X-Band AGC data signal can arrive on the
high speed data channel (M-766) or the wide band data channel (M-769).
Upon initialization of SHARP and acquisition of a connection to the
channelized data source, SHARP begins to accumulate data from this
channel. Data from this channel would ideally arrive approximately every
15 seconds; actually there are frequent gaps in the data. When a new
datum arrives at a time which is within a certain tolerance of an integer
multiple of 15 seconds after the time of the previous datum, SHARP fills
in the gap, if any, by linear interpolation. When SHARP has accumulated
64 (actual and/or interpolated) data points, it calculates the FFT to
resolve the AGC signal into frequency components. It compares the
magnitude of the component at the conscan frequency with the average of
the magnitudes of selected other components. If the conscan component's
magnitude is more than twice the average of the other components'
magnitudes, SHARP signals an alarm indicating that the antenna may be
about to go off point.
Once it has computed an FFT on 64 data points, SHARP will compute a new
FFT each time it receives an AGC datum at a time that is within the
tolerance of an integer multiple of 15 seconds after the previous datum.
Thus, if data were to consistently arrive every 15 seconds, SHARP would
compute the first FFT approximately 16 minutes after starting, and would
compute another one every 15 seconds thereafter.
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5. SHARP Outputs
The SHARP system provides numerous sophisticated graphical displays for
spacecraft and ground station monitoring. A comprehensive user interface
has been developed to facilitate easy access to all pertinent data and
analysis. An interface exists for each major module of the SHARP system.
Each interface provides customized functions that allow data specific to
that module to be easily accessed, viewed, and manipulated. Each SHARP
module can be accessed from any other module at any time, and all
displays are in color with mouse sensitivity and menu-driven commands.
As one of the primary purposes of SHARP is to provide warnings about
alarm conditions within the telecommunications path, the displays have
been designed to provide this information. Several graphical displays in
SHARP automatically highlight alarmed events as they occur. These
displays offer information ranging from the location of a problem to the
probable cause of the alarm.
The operators of a SHARP system need to be able to review and, on
occasion, change the data stored within the SHARP system. For example,
if late changes are made to the Integrated Sequence of Events or if the
alarm limits need to be changed on a particular real-time data channel,
these need to be incorporated to prevent erroneous behavior within the
SHARP diagnostic module. Therefore, some of the SHARP displays provide
the operators the ability to display and edit portions of the data stored
within the system.
Displays exist that allow the operator to review and possibly change the
data within SHARP. Other displays are driven by the real-time data.
These are given in the Figure 5-1.
Displays to review and change data
Alarm Limit Tables
Integrated Sequence of Events
Predicts
Displays driven by real-time data
Attitude and Articulation Control
Alarm Meters
Alarm History
Alarm Warnings
Block Diagrams
Channelized Data Monitoring
Channelized Data Plots
Fast Fourier Transform
Link Status
Figure 5-1 SHARP Displays
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Each of these displays, except for the Channelized Data Monitoring display,
has a mechanism to give alarm warnings in real time. For example, the
Channelized Data Plots change the color of the graph for a channel when
its data values go past the alarm limits. The mechanism used within each
display will be described in more detail within the discussion of each.
There are certain features that are common to all of the configurations of
the SHARP displays. Refer to Figure 5-2. (The SHARP displays use color
extensively. The black and white images in this document use shading to
try to give an indication of the use of color.) The top line of the display
contains the JPL logo, a title bar indicating the current display, and a
clock giving the Greenwich Mean Time. The next section down contains
two or more menus with an alarm status window on the right. The alarm
status window gives an indication of the number of soft and hard alarms
currently active. The menu immediately to the left of the alarm status
window, titled "Program Selection," allows the user to change the
configuration of the display from one module of SHARP to another. Any
other menus allow the user to modify the contents of the selected
displayed configuration.
The large central portion of the display changes to display data, graphics,
or plots, depending upon what configuration the user has selected. The
area will contain one or more windows.
The bottom of the display contains a window that allows the developers of
the SHARP system and the more experienced users to check the status of
SHARP and recover from various errors. It provides an interface into the
LISP environment.
Each display will be described in the remainder of this section.
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5.1. Alarm Limit Tables Display
The SHARP system provides an alarm limit interface which allows on-line
viewing and editing of established spacecraft engineering alarm limits,
DSS performance limits, ground data system limits, and residual
thresholds. See Figure 5-3. The user specifies which type of alarm limit
to view, and for each channel of that type, the following information is
displayed:
Channel Number
Channel Name
Lowest Nominal Value
Highest Nominal Value
Low Alarm Limit
High Alarm Limit
Low Display Range Value
High Display Range Value
Comments
If the specified alarm limits depend on a particular spacecraft
configuration, the user is prompted to identify the configuration (e.g.,
whether the the X-Band Transmitter Power Level is high or low, etc.
Refer to Section 4.2.1.). The limit values are then displayed, along with
the conditions of the specified configuration, as demonstrated in the
upper portion of Figure 5-3. The operator may subsequently change any
configuration condition to display the appropriate table of limits.
Users are able to make permanent or temporary changes to these tables.
To temporarily alter any of these limits, the user makes the appropriate
changes to the desired tables. Changes are made by-_lecting a channel in
the table to modify and then filling in the ensuing menu with the desired
modifications. This capability, which provides a manual override option,
enables the operators to suppress alarms or to set tighter alarm limits
for closer scrutiny of a particular event, with no intervening procedures
that would otherwise be required in the current operations environment.
To permanently change any alarm tables, the user follows the same
procedure as above and then saves the changes. To rewrite the data files
that contain the alarm limit tables so that they will be used the next time
that SHARP is started, the user selects Save Alarms in the Alarm Limit
menu. For the SHARP prototype no security feature was included that
would prevent unauthorized users from making changes to the alarm
limits. This feature can be included so that only authorized users could
make such changes.
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Figure 5-3 Alarm Limit Display
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5.2. Integrated Sequence of Events
The SHARP system provides a user interface for the Integrated Sequence
of Events which offers numerous capabilities to the operator. Figure 5-4
shows a sample ISOE display. Viewing of any ISOE is available by
specifying the day or week of interest. The stripped telecommunications
data will appear in a scrolling window near the top of the display, and on-
line additions, deletions, and other changes can then be performed on the
selected ISOE via menu-driven commands. Edits can be performed with
ease, as the self-guiding menus contain explanations of the complex ISOE
data.
SHARP's on-line editing capabilities allow the operator to enter into the
SHARP system the latest modifications as specified by the ISOE
correction sheets and reduce the likelihood of an operator referencing
outdated material.
Translation of spacecraft commands from their raw form into more
understandable summaries of spacecraft activity may be performed. The
user can request status summaries of any activity. For example, a request
can be made to view all values of the variable "Data Mode" during a user-
specified period of time.
A history of user actions is maintained so that as the ISOE is updated, the
operator can verify all modifications that are made. The operator then has
the option to save these changes or revert back to the original ISOE.
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Figure 5-4 Integrated Sequence of Events
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5.3. Predicts
The Predicts interface in SHARP allows both tabular and graphical
displays of prediction data. An example of this display is in Figure 5-5.
The operator can display in tabular form raw predicts, pass predicts,
instantaneous predicts, and residuals for any specified time range. Two
display windows exist in the predicts interface so that the user may
simultaneously view alternate forms of data. The time period, station,
and power mode are displayed above each window to identify the predict
data context.
Along with the tabular data, a color-coded Deep Space Station availability
graph has been designed which enables rapid identification of stations
within view of the spacecraft for any specified time period. Situations
that mandate that another Deep Space Station be acquired can be
addressed immediately as opposed to the more arduous current method
which requires the manual look-up of each station at the specified time
period.
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5.4. Channelized Data Plotting
Telemetry data from the spacecraft, tracking stations, and other relevant
systems are collected in the JPL computers and separated into channels
that are distributed for processing. For the Voyager project, the data
were distributed from the Test and Telemetry Subsystem (TTS)
computers. These channels contain the values of hundreds of spacecraft
engineering parameters and station performance parameters. The
channels are plotted in the Voyager real-time area and are visually
monitored to ensure that they remain within their pre-specified limits.
The current Voyager data display system consists of plots on black and
white computer screens. The constraints of this system allow the
construction of only five plot display pages for the entire spacecraft
team, of which the telecommunications subsystem has control of just a
single page. One display page is capable of showing up to three plotted
channels. In order to change the plot parameters to select different
channels to display, the operator must punch a card and feed it into the
system's card reader. To obtain an additional plot, special permission
must be secured from personnel of another subsystem who are willing to
temporarily give up one of their own plots.
SHARP's display that plots the channelized data, illustrated in Figure 5-6,
is a significant improvement over existing capabilities. The user can
dynamically customize the display at any time by selecting which and how
many channels to view, the time scale, and the data range for each plot.
Each plot can be color-coded by the user for easy visual distinction
between displayed channels.
In the example in Figure 5-6, four channels are plotted. The data in view
cover a period of 1.5 hours. The data range for Channel E-025 data, for
example, is from -95 to -155. The colors used for each channel were
different shades of blue or green.
When a channel is in alarm, its corresponding data points and connecting
lines are plotted in red (hard alarm) or yellow (soft alarm), allowing the
operator to quickly notice an alarm condition. The channel's associated
alarm limits may be optionally overlaid onto the channel's plot for further
information. For example if Channel M-764, a monitor channel with fixed
alarm limits, had a soft alarm limit of 1000 and a hard alarm limit of
1025, a horizontal yellow line would be drawn at the value of 1000, and a
red line at 1025. These lines would allow the operator to see how close
the data were to each alarm limit. For engineering channels where the
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Figure 5-6 Channelized Data Plot
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alarm limits may be changing over time, the red and yellow alarm limit
lines would not be just constant horizontal lines, but would show steps to
indicate when the configuration changes of the spacecraft would cause
changes to the alarm limits.
Each data point is mouse sensitive to provide time and numerical value
indicators. Clicking the mouse on a data point will display (or erase)
cross hairs with the time and value. At the bottom of Figure 5-6, one can
see the data point on Channel M-767 has a value of 296 at a time of
00:46:50 on day 271.
An automatic counter continually indicates the number of data points per
plot. This information is located at the top of the plotting window after
each label for the channels. 857 points have been plotted on Channel E-
025.
Real-time data can be plotted as it is being received. Also, if the operator
chooses to review past data, historical data that are stored in the
channelized data database can be plotted. The displays are can be scrolled
along the time axis to allow the operator to move through more data than
that which are currently being presented.
These plots can represent information as graphs of actual or derived data
versus time, x/y plots, or scatter plots. Each type of plot can use linear
or logarithmic scales. One example of a plot of derived data is a residual
plot which shows the variance between the real-time data of a channel
and its expected value.
For the Voyager encounter, two types of plots were used. The majority of
the plots were channelized data versus time. A second type of plot used
was the scatter plot of one data channel graphed against another data
channel. Telecommunications personnel specifically requested that a
scatter plot of Bit Error Rate (BER) versus DSS Symbol Signal-to-Noise
ratio (DSS SSNR) be constructed. This provided information on whether
the actual Bit Error Rate was consistent with the received SSNR. A
sample BER scatter plot is shown in Figure 5-7.
The DSS SSNR can be received on either of channels M-764 or M-767
depending upon the state of the telecommunications link. The BER is
determined from a combination of data from channel S-752 and the ISOE.
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5.5. Block Diagrams
The SHARP system provides a graphical capability in the form of on-line
functional block diagram schematics of the end-to-end communications
path from the spacecraft through a Deep Space Station (DSS) and Ground
Communications Facility (GCF) to the Mission Control and Computing
Center (MCCC) at JPL and final destination of the Test and Telemetry
System (TTS) computers (see Figure 5-2). This facility allows the
operators to view various components or subsystems of the
telecommunications path in a schematic form.
The top-level diagram could be considered to be the base node of a tree
structure of diagrams. (See Figure 5-8.) Each block diagram may contain
links to one or more other block diagrams. By moving through the block
diagrams, the user can see successive levels of detail of the
telecommunications system. The SHARP system focuses on two areas: the
spacecraft and the DSS. The telecommunications subsystem is very
comprehensive, as spacecraft schematics have been developed for all of
its individual components. Diagrams of two DSS areas have also been
developed. Figure 5-8 illustrates the Voyager telecommunications
subsystem.
-JiS-band Exciter l J
_lS-band Exciter 2I
--IX-band Exciter 1 I
--IX-band Exciter 2J
-..[Spacecraft Receiver 11
-._Spacecraft Receiver 21
--I Command Detection Unit A I
--I Command Detection Unit B ]
--IS-band Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier 11
--.IS-band Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier 21
•-IX-band Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier 11
--IX-band Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier 21
--IS-band X-band Antenna I
TriVia
Figure 5-8 Block Diagrams
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The icons of each diagram represent a component or subsystem. These are
mouse sensitive. When an icon is selected, the block diagram it represents
is displayed.
The block diagrams were constructed by using an object-oriented drawing
program developed specifically for the SHARP effort. (Refer to Appendix D
for a discussion of GEd, a graphics editor.) Since each component's icon is
implemented as an object, it is relatively easy to change its color. This
feature is used so that components that are functioning normally are
colored green; components that are off are white; and components that
SHARP has diagnosed to be in an alarm condition are red.
The status of the various spacecraft and DSS systems are continually
updated on the diagrams, allowing the operator to quickly identify problem
areas as anomalies arise.
There are two modes in which the block diagrams can be activated. They
can either be passive, in which case the user must act to cause a diagram
to be displayed. Alternatively, the block diagrams can be responsive to the
changing status of a component. In this case, when a block diagram
changes, it automatically comes to view. The former behavior is the
default by choice of the designers of SHARP. It was felt the users would
not want the intrusive behavior of the latter mode.
Whether a component is colored green (on) or white (off) is determined
from its operating status. When SHARP is first started, the ISOE data is
searched to determine the status of each component at that point in time.
The components of each diagram are then colored as appropriate.
SHARP must guarantee that the block diagrams follow changes in the
functioning of the components as specified in the ISOE. To do this a
separate process runs that updates the block diagram component colors as
changes occur in their states. This updating process searches forward in
the ISOE from the time of the most recent change. This search is looking
for the next time when an event occurs that will cause a change in the
block diagrams. When this time is determined, the updating process
becomes inactive. At the arrival of that time the process becomes active,
changes the coloring of the proper block diagram component, and then
searches again for when the next change will occur.
The determination of whether a component is turned red (to indicate an
alarm state) occurs when real-time data is being received. The AI module
contains the necessary information needed to be able to change one or
5-16
more diagrams when an alarm is indicated. As the AI module detects a
channel going into or out of alarm, it does the work necessary to make
these changes appear in the appropriate block diagrams.
5.6. Alarm Warnings
Alarm warnings do not actually have their own display configuration.
Instead, this is a part of the interface that allows the user to be notified
whenever an alarm occurs regardless of the context the user is in.
Whenever an alarm occurs, a window appears on the screen and waits for
the user to acknowledge the message. A sample of this is shown in Figure
5-10. It is possible to change the behavior of SHARP so that alarm
messages are not displayed, but are only recorded to the Alarm History.
The user has control over what classes of alarms should or should not be
presented to him. It is also possible to set a time-out period so that the
alarm warning windows automatically close if that period has elapsed.
Message from the diagnostician at GMT 163 20:22:54;
Hard Alarm: E-025 S/C AGC (Automatic Gain Control) in alarm.
Source: S/C Engineering Data.
Explanation i: The DSN Exciter Frequency is in alarm. The wrong ramp
was entered into the Digitally Controlled Oscillator (DCO).
Corrective Action: Advise DSN to restart the DCO with correct frequency offset
and ramp rate.
Explanation 2: The AGC detector has failed.
Corrective Action: Notify SCT personnel.
Explanation 3: S/C Antenna is off point.
Corrective Action: Check Attitude Control data.
More Information: Consult data in the Channellzed Data Display
for channels E-025 (S/C AGC), M-777 (Exc Freq), E-074 (Attitude Pitch),
E-181 (Attitude Yaw), and E-189 (Attitude Roll).
Please click any mouse button to acknowledge.
Figure 5-10 Sample Alarm Warning
5.7. Alarm History
The Alarm History provides a visual display of all alarm messages that
are generated by SHARP. It allOws the user to scroll the display in order
to access messages that are off the screen. The display includes a status
window of how many of the various types of alert messages have been
generated so far, e.g., alarm messages, diagnostic messages, etc.
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5.8. Alarm Meters
This display of SHARP, shown in Figure 5-11, provides to the operator a
simultaneous view of the values of all channels in alarm, and (for most
channels) where these values stand with respect to the respective
channels' alarm limits. When a channel goes into alarm, a new meter is
created for it. When a channel that had been in alarm goes out of alarm,
its meter is deleted. The meter pointers showing channel values are
updated whenever new data values are received.
The large central area of the display configuration can contain one or more
meters, each corresponding to a different channel. Each meter consists of
a horizontal line segment, ticks, labels of the numbers corresponding to
the left and right ends of the segment, a label indicating the channel
name, and a pointer. For simple numerical alarm limits, the horizontal
line has regions colored red, yellow, and green to indicate ranges of hard
alarms, soft alarms and nominal behavior for the channel. For other more
complicated alarm determinations, the line is colored blue.
The pointer points to the coordinate on the line segment corresponding to
the channel value; and a displayed string, such as "146.0 at
277:02:46:37", gives the value and time of the last datum on the channel.
After the value and time, the string may also contain such a substring as
"(OK at 277:02:57:22)", indicating that the alarm limits on the channel
have changed since the latest datum was reported, and that if the channel
still has that latest value, it is not in alarm any more. If the meter's
horizontal line segment is drawn in green, yellow, and red, the pointer
triangle and string will be drawn in the color indicating the appropriate
level of alarm (as of the time of the datum). If the line segment is blue,
the pointer triangle and string will also be blue.
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Figure 5-11 Alarm Meters
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5.9. Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem Display
Currently telecommunications (and Attitude and Articulation Control)
personnel examine a black and white plot page which contains three
individual plots depicting spacecraft pitch, yaw, and roll movement.
These displays are necessary to monitor the attitude behavior of the
spacecraft, yet do not allow easy recognition of alarm conditions.
SHARP's Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem display combines
various sources of information to produce an integrated graphical
representation of spacecraft attitude and articulation. As shown in Figure
5-12, this display combines spacecraft motion parameters (pitch, yaw,
and roll) and records spacecraft movement over time. In addition to the
graphical layout, actual motion parameter values and time are also shown
to augment the display. As new attitude data become available, both the
graphical and textual components of the display are updated to reflect
current spacecraft positional information.
The spacecraft is represented as a large cross hair in the attitude display.
This icon moves around the display, and turns red when any of the attitude
parameters are in alarm.
A limit cycle box which represents defined spacecraft deadband limits
(limits for pitch, yaw, and roll) encloses the spacecraft icon. The
deadband limits are obtained from the ISOE and the limit cycle box
changes size and shape according to pitch and yaw deadband changes. The
roll deadband box is represented as a Maltese cross around the spacecraft
icon. The spacecraft icon rotates within the roll limit cycle box to
indicate roll alterations.
As the yaw and pitch values change, a line is drawn from the old value to
the new value. These trailing vectors from the spacecraft icon establish
the path of the spacecraft and enable the visualization of spacecraft
movement over time.
Alarm conditions are easily detected as the spacecraft icon drifts outside
of the designated deadband box. The spacecraft turns red to denote the
alarm condition, and the corresponding pitch, yaw, or roll information is
highlighted red as well. This information is passed to the diagnostician
which will subsequently notify the operator of the attitude alarm state.
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Figure 5-12 Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem Display
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5.10. Fast Fourier Transform
The "Fast Fourier Transform of DSS AGC", or "DSS AGC FFT", display shows
the operator a frequently-updated bar chart of the magnitudes of the
components of the FFT of the automatic gain control (AGC) channel, with
the conscan component distinguished by its color. The display also shows
a list of the times at which actual channel data were received for this FFT
and the gaps during which data were estimated by interpolation. An
example of this display is given in Figure 5-13.
When this configuration is selected, the bar chart display is updated every
time a new FFT is computed. The heights of the bars are proportional to
the magnitudes of the components, with the scale indicated by the
vertical axis. Most of the components are shown as blue bars.
The conscan component is shown as a green bar if it is not in alarm. If it
is in alarm, the part of the bar above the momentary alarm limit (twice
the average of the magnitudes of the second through thirty-second
components of the FFT except the conscan component itself) is red, and
the bottom is green.
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5.11. Link Status
Among the new graphical analysis capabilities provided by the SHARP
system is the telecommunications link status display, as shown in Figure
5-14. This facility was developed to combine multiple sources of data
into one graphical presentation.
The SHARP link status display is a significant improvement over current
telecommunications capabilities, where station coverage, spacecraft
transmitter power status, and data rate are listed in an unofficial
graphical sequence hardcopy product (SFOS), or are determined by
manually searching through the hardcopied ISOE. Station uplink must be
viewed on a black and white DTV terminal. Projected downlink, data
outages, spacecraft-DSS lock status, and spacecraft data quality are
manually determined in real time, and manual analysis is performed when
the alarms indicate a possible anomaly.
SHARP's link status display capability provides an abundance of
information to the operator at one glance. The analysis provides the user
with such valuable information as time ranges and explanations of data
outages. It can warn the operator when to expect noisy or corrupted data
and why.
Various types of data are graphed over time, which appear on the
horizontal axis as hourly (the default) increments. The upper portion of
the graph represents station coverage of the specified spacecraft. The
stations are color coded according to their size and type: 70-meter (DSS
14, 43, 63), 34-meter high efficiency (12, 42, 61), 34-meter tracking (15,
45, 65), and non-DSN (Parkes, Australia, the Very Large Array in New
Mexico, and Japan). SHARP examines the ISOE data to determine station
coverage during the specified time period, and then draws horizontal bars
to represent the stations. Each bar is labeled with its corresponding DSS
identification number.
Also drawn in non-real time is the spacecraft data transmission rate.
Time bars are drawn in green and labeled with the corresponding data rate
during that time interval. This information, along with data outages, is
taken from the ISOE database. When the ISOE is translated, those events
which are known to cause telemetry outages or degradations (e.g., no
station coverage or ongoing spacecraft maneuver) are noted for uses such
as this one. The outage information is overlaid in black on the data rate
line.
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Figure 5-14 Link Status
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At the bottom portion of the graph, s-band and x-band transmitter power
status is drawn. The bars are color coded to represent high-power level
(green), low-power level (yellow), or off status (black).
Two lines representing station transmitter uplink (signal transmission)
and projected downlink are drawn in real time. When an uplink begins, a
bar starts to be drawn and advances in time as the uplink continues. As
that is plotting, the expected resulting downlink is drawn at the time it
should occur, which is a round-trip light time (RTLT) into the future. In
Figure 5-14, an uplink begins on day 270 at 16:00. The resulting downlink
begins on day 271 at 00:30.
If the two-way non-coherent (TWNC) mode is scheduled to be off during
the downlink, the data rate line at RTLT after uplink is painted yellow to
indicate two-way data mode. When an uplink is low and the TWNC is off,
there may be degraded data. To determine if there is degraded data, the
Spacecraft Receiver AGC (E-025) is examined at the RTLT after an uplink.
To warn an operator the data rate line will turn from yellow to orange
when the uplink is low, indicating that there is noisy data due to
excessive two-way phase noise. When the uplink is extremely low (<-140
riB), the data rate line turns red to indicate that the uplink is in the "Quasi
region" and data have been destroyed because of extreme amounts of
excessive phase noise due to a best lock frequency (BLF) estimate error.
Spacecraft-DSS lock status information is overlaid on the downlink line,
which turns from yellow to orange to indicate Quasi region data, and red
to indicate that either the DSS missed the spacecraft because it was
tuned to the wrong frequency, the DSS transmitter was not radiating, or
there was a spacecraft failure.
Each time bar is mouse sensitive, and will display the starting and ending
time of the bar, or event. If there is an explanation associated with the
event, such as a spacecraft maneuver telemetry outage or noisy data, then
this information will be presented to the user.
5.12. Channelized Data Monitoring
This module allows a SHARP application developer or maintainer to watch
and debug the overall operation of SHARP with respect to all of its data
sources. It maintains and displays numerous status icons in a variety of
formats such as raw numbers, tables, graphs, meters, and textual
displays. This display is primarily intended for the developers of SHARP
but may be useful for the SHARP user when telemetry status is needed at
a glance.
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6. Voyager Demonstration
6.1. Installation in Telecommunications Real-Time Area
The development of the SHARP system took place within the facilities of
the Artificial Intelligence group. It was possible from this location to
acquire all of the necessary ISOE, Predict, and real-time channelized data
required for the operation of SHARP. This allowed the developers to work
on the system in an environment similar to that of the real-time
operations area without disrupting the telecommunications personnel.
Approximately one month before the Voyager encounter with Neptune, a
Symbolics workstation with SHARP loaded on it was moved into the real-
time telecommunications work area. The installation of the SHARP
system in the real-time area was very simple. There were two
differences between the development environment and the real-time
environment.
The first difference between the two areas was in the way the
channelized data was received by SHARP. In the development environment,
the channelized data was received via a modem connection from the real-
time area. In the real-time area the data was received by SHARP via a
direct connection. The modem connection was sometimes unreliable. On
occasion, the developers of SHARP would have to call the operators in the
real-time area and ask them to reset the modem transmitting the data
when it had become locked up. In contrast to the sporadic unreliability of
the modem connection, the reliability of the channelized data connection
in the real-time area was flawless.
The second difference between the two areas was the availability of
network connections. The machines in the development area were all
connected together on Ethernet with several machines acting as file
servers. The processor in the real-time area was not networked.
Unabridged ISOE files and raw Predict files could be acquired in the
development area over the Ethernet connection. Therefore all ISOE and
Predict database generation was done in the development area. In order to
take database updates and software changes to the real-time area, tapes
were carried between the two sites. A permanent application of SHARP
would ideally have network connections to all of its data sources.
6.2. Events
During the demonstration period, SHARP helped find the cause of a Voyager
science data error anomaly which appeared in the telemetry from the
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spacecraft as an excess error count. After SHARP detected the problem,
its graphical displays were used by telecommunications personnel to
identify the problem and to characterize its magnitude. The problem was
in the Voyager ground data system and was corrected by the replacement
of a wide-band interface unit in the Voyager Data Acquisition and Capture
System (DACS). SHARP helped verify that the replacement of the unit
actually fixed the problem. In a matter of hours, SHARP was able to
assist operators in solving an anomalous condition which could have
easily escalated to a more serious problem during the encounter itself,
and could have taken human operators days or weeks to isolate without
SHARP.
Also during the demonstration period, the knowledge engineer of SHARP
and the domain expert would review alarms that SHARP had given.
Generally, these alarms were correct, in one alarm situation, SHARP was
giving warnings about the loss of the telecommunications signal. This
ultimately turned out to be a false alarm as the spacecraft was
undertaking a particular maneuver that the SHARP knowledge base did not
contain, thereby leading the diagnostic system into an erroneous
conclusion about antenna pointing. In other cases, SHARP was able to
detect conditions where the Deep Space Station antenna tracking the
spacecraft was drifting off point. SHARP detected these problems in a
matter of seconds, and reported the condition to the telecommunications
operators. Unfortunately, due to their previous lack of ability to detect
and diagnose antenna pointing problems, the real-time
telecommunications operators at JPL did not have procedures for alerting
the Deep Space Station operators (possibly on the other side of the world)
to antenna drift situations detected by SHARP. When the antenna drift
reached a sufficient magnitude and urgency for the station operators to
notice and correct, SHARP was able to detect the resolution of the
problem and cancel the alarm situation. SHARP detected and correctly
diagnosed other non-critical problems with the receiver automatic gain
control and the S-band traveling wave tube temperature on board the
spacecraft.
On the whole, the encounter with Neptune went extremely smoothly for
the Voyager spacecraft. SHARP did not get a chance to make any really
dramatic diagnoses, and the diagnostic system described in this
publication did not get a strenuous operational test. This underscores the
difficulty in testing the diagnostic ability of real-time monitoring and
control expert systems in operation settings: you may not get any
problems! Using simulated data (based on historical problems with the
spacecraft and based on synthetic situations) we were able to test SHARP
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much more thoroughly in the laboratory. SHARP is able to analyze 39
classes of telecommunications problems, and make about 60 unique
diagnoses which require some problem solving by the mini-experts to
determine. Another 20 telecommunications problems are detectable by
SHARP, but can be reported directly to the operator. Our domain expert
estimates that SHARP covers approximately 80% of the known types of
faults experienced in spacecraft telecommunications for Voyager. The
remaining 20% include diagnoses which could be made if SHARP had the
appropriate real-time data and additional knowledge engineering. As with
most complex systems, there is always the possibility of novel faults.
SHARP does not have the ability to successfully diagnose and explain a
novel type of fault (nor was it intended to), but we are confident in the
system's ability to detect departures from expected, nominal behavior.
6.3. Evaluation
The evaluation of SHARP by telecommunications personnel was not as
thorough as the developers would have liked. By the time SHARP was
installed in the real-time area, the quantity of work required by the
operators had increased in anticipation of the Neptune encounter. As a
result, it was not possible for the developers and the operators to work
together for extended periods in order to thoroughly walk through the
capabilities within SHARP.
The response by the telecommunications operators to SHARP left two
major impressions with the developers. The first was that the operators
were enthusiastic about the potential of a fully operational SHARP
system. The second was that they would have liked a more responsive
display interface.
SHARP functioned well during the installation in the real-time area. A
number of problems in the software were discovered, but this was not
surprising. This version of SHARP was not built to be an operation system
with minimal bugs; it was built as rapidly as possible to get a prototype
running to determine if the ideas motivating the SHARP architecture were
correct. The developers feel that the SHARP demonstration proved that
the ideas were correct, but that work needs to be done to improve their
implementation. This work is under way.
6-3

7. Conclusions and Continuing Work
Spacecraft and ground data systems operations present a rigorous
environment in the area of monitoring and anomaly detection and
diagnosis. With a number of planetary missions scheduled for the near
future, the effort to staff and support these operations will present
significant challenges.
The SHARP system was developed to address the challenges of automation
in a multi-mission operations environment by augmenting conventional
automation technologies with artificial intelligence. Its successful
development and demonstration have led to a number of important
conclusions. First and foremost, artificial intelligence technology is
ready for application to spaceflight operations. The techniques can be
used alongside conventional computer science techniques, and diagnostic
knowledge-based systems can be embedded in the resulting application
system. Acceptable real-time performance can be achieved. SHARP was
never pushed to the limit of its speed or memory resources; in fact, most
of its time was spent idle, waiting for new engineering data to process.
This gives us confidence for broadening the approach in SHARP to multiple
spacecraft subsystems.
The evaluation by Voyager personnel also taught us that the types of
automation provided by SHARP are highly desired by operations personnel,
and are not viewed as job-threatening (although they may be in some
cases). Operators were able to readily use the system with minimal
training, and were enthusiastic about using the wide variety of graphical
displays and options.
7.1. Benefits of SHARP to Mission Operations
There are four principal areas where the JPL telecommunications users of
SHARP expect to see benefits from application of the system and its
descendents, which we are now developing. These areas are safety,
workforce savings, reliability, and productivity.
Through its accurate detection, analysis, and tracking of the antenna drift
and pointing conditions during the encounter, SHARP showed that it can
detect and analyze importan t problems in a matter of seconds which
currently take human operators minutes or hours. This provides an extra
margin for ensuring the safety of the spacecraft, and thereby supports the
success of the mission as a whole. The SHARP Voyager
telecommunications domain expert, a man with over 20 years of
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experience who has cognizance not only for Voyager telecommunications
operations but for other spacecraft as well, has stated publicly that the
Soviets would not have lost the first Phobos spacecraft if they had
applied SHARP to their telecommunications operations. One of the stated
causes of the loss of the Phobos spacecraft was that the spacecraft
antenna drifted unti_ the telecommunications link was lost due to a faulty
attitude control command.
A second major benefit from application of SHARP will be in the area of
workforce savings. Through its automation of many manual functions,
SHARP promises to reduce the real-time link analysis operations staff by
a factor of five, and there is reason to believe that similar savings may be
possible in other operations areas. This is precisely the type of benefit
from automation which is necessary to support the single multi-mission
flight team in the new JPL Space Flight Operations Center.
The system-wide status monitoring afforded by SHARP helps operators
assure correct telecommunications system configuration. This is
expected to reduce the number of commanding errors to the spacecraft and
ground systems, and thereby reduce the loss or corruption of data due to
configuration problems.
FinalJy, the SHARP system is expected to enhance the productivity of
operations personnel by freeing them from the tedium of watching raw
data and interpreting it for themselves. SHARP shifts the burden of
routine monitoring operations, and most of the boring, manual
computations which are involved, away from the operator to itself. This
will enable operations personnel to perform required analyses more
efficiently, and to exert a higher level of "supervisory monitoring" over
multiple spacecraft subsystems on multiple spacecraft.
7.2. Current SHARP Development Effort
SHARP is now being extended and developed to a higher level of readiness
so that flight projects such as Voyager, Magellan, Galileo, and others can
use it directly. The system will be completed in 1990 and delivered to the
Space Flight Operations Center for further evaluation and application to
Magellan telecommunications. Separately, SHARP is also being applied to
the Deep Space Network, Network Operations Control Center at JPL, with
an operational system planned for 1991. Applications for remote
monitoring and control of spaceborne instruments and experiments are
also under consideration.
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A major aspect of the current activities is to move SHARP from the
Symbolics platform to a Unix platform. This will increase its portability,
and allow a more ready access to data within the different operation
centers at JPL.
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A. Appendix A - Predicts
A.I. Raw Predicts: Content and Parsing
Each raw predict file contains information which is divided into four
sections:
Uplink Carrier Design Control Table
Downlink Carrier Design Control Table
Telemetry Channel Design Control Table
Telemetry Performance Tabulations
Figures A-1 to A-4 (at the end of this appendix) show sample pages of
each type of information. The SHARP predicts module is concerned only
with particular predict values from the telemetry performance
tabulations section. As seen in Figure A-4, this section contains header
information identifying the spacecraft, the x-band transmitter power
level, and the Deep Space Station (DSS), followed by actual predict values
for elevation, uplink carrier, total power (PT), downlink carrier, system
noise temperature (SNT), data power with respect to noise (PD/No),
telemetry margin, tolerance, and Bit SNR (ST/No).
Heuristic adaptive parsing is implemented for SHARP's raw predicts data-
base. Periodically the format of this data source changes without mission
operations being notified. Generally this would require the raw predicts
parser to be rewritten to incorporate the new format. However, SHARP
utilizes Augmented Transition Network (ATN) techniques to accomplish
adaptive parsing. The advantage of such an ATN lies in its ability to parse
the database according to semantic content rather than syntactic
structure. The raw predicts database can therefore be modified and yet
remain successfully parsable. This heuristically controlled, format-
insensitive parsing ensures continuity despite format modifications in
predict generation.
The following sections give notes regarding the generation of the other
predict information from the raw predicts.
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A.2.
I.
I1.
III.
Generation of Pass Predicts from Raw Predicts
Select the appropriate Pass parameters:
S/C: 32 (Voyager 2)
DSS: from ISOE (DSS)
X-band Transmitter Power: from ISOE (XbdXmtPwr)
Time: Time of Pass
Based on the Pass parameters, extract values from Predict File database:
Elev (deg), Az (deg), UL Carr (dbM), PT (dBm), SNT (k), PD/N 0 (dB)
Modify the raw predict values of PT and PD/N 0 for RFS mode as follows:
IV.
Predict File ISOE
Power XbdXmtLevel Action
Hi Hi PT=PT and PD/N0 = PD/N0
Hi Lo PT=PT - 1.9 and PD/N 0 = PD/N 0 - 1.9
Lo Hi PT=PT + 1.9 and PD/N0 = PD/N0 + 1.9
Lo Lo PT=PT and PD/N0 = PD/N0
Calculate pass predicts using the following algorithms:
1. SSNR Pass Predict (dB)
= PD/No- 101og(DataRate) + 20log(sin ¢) - SystemLoss - 3.01
All logarithms are base 10.
PD/No value is in dB.
DataRate is obtained from ISOE. If DataRate in kbps, convert DataRate to bps.
XbdModlndex
@=20+ 47 * 60
(i.e. Modlndex = 0 => $ = 20 °)
@value is in degrees, not radians
To determine the System Loss, use:
DataRate SystemLoss
• .16 kbps 0.5 dB
.16 kbps 0.6 dB
.08 kbps 0.8 dB
.04 kbps 1.2 dB
< .04 kbps 2.0 dB
The term -3.01 is a result of converting from BSNR to SSNRo
2. DSS AGC Pass Predict (dBm):
= PT + 20log(Cos (t)) if ISOE XbdRng is off.
= PT + 20log(Cos ¢) - 0.2 if ISOE XbdRng is on.
PT value is in dBm.
(I)value is same as previous calculation.
3. SIC AGC Pass Predict (dBm):
18
= 10log XmtPwrKw + UL Carr Raw Predict + RSup
XmtPwrKw = Transmitter Power in Kilowatts (from ISOE)
RSup = Ranging Suppression (DSS Actual, currently not channelized)
4. SNT Pass Predict (k):
= SNT Raw Predict
5. Elev Pass Predict (deg):
= Elev Raw Predict
6. Az Pass Predict (deg):
= Az Raw Predict
The hourly Pass Predicts are then interpolated to produce values per 15 seconds.
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I1.
III.
Generation of Instantaneous Predicts from Pass
Calculate Antenna Pointing Error, Ep, using S/C actuals, Pitch and Yaw:
Ep = _/PE 2 + YE 2, where
PE = Pitch Axis Error = k(Pitch Telemetry - DeadBand midpoint)
YE = Yaw Axis Error = k(Yaw Telemetry - DeadBand midpoint)
Predicts
Pitch Telemetry = E-174 (DN)
Yaw Telemetry = E-181 (DN)
DeadBand midpoint = 128
k = .00586
Calculate Antenna Pointing Loss, Lp:
Lp (dB)= 10 log Cos 5 (100Ep), or 50 log Cos (100Ep)
Calculate instantaneous predicts using the following algorithms:
. Instantaneous SSNR Predict (dB):
= SSNR Pass Predict (dB) - Lp (dB)+ 10 log ( SNT Pass Predict (K))Actual SNT (K) '
Actual SNT = M-765 (HS) or M-768 (WB)
2. Instantaneous DSS AGC Predict (dB):
= DSS AGO Pass Predict (dBm) - Lp (dB)
3. Instantaneous DSS SNT Predict (K):
= SNT Pass Predict (no adjustments).
, Instantaneous S/C AGC Predict (dB):
Actual Xmt Pwr.
= S/C AGC Pass Predict (dBm) + 10 log (Pred Xmt Pwr ) " CSup - RSup
[RTLTadj],
Actual Transmit Power = M-776
Predicted Transmit Power = modifiable static value = 18.0 kw
CSup = Command suppression (DSS Actual, currently not channelized, so use 0)
RSup = Ranging suppression (DSS Actual, currently not channelized, so use 0)
This predict is adjusted for RTLT. It is compared to the Actual S/C AGC one RTLT from
now.
5. Instantaneous DSS ELEV Predict (deg):
= ELEV Pass Predict (no adjustments).
6. Instantaneous DSS AZ Predict (deg):
= AZ Pass Predict (no adjustments).
7. Instantaneous DSS EXC FREQ Predict (Hz):
= Start Freq (Hz)+ (Current Time - Start Time)*Ramp Rate (Hz/sec)
8. Instantaneous DSS XMT PWR Predict (kw):
= ISOE XmtPwrKw Value at time t (no adjustments)
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II.
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.
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°
,
°
Residual Calculations
Obtain actual values from the following telemetry channels:
Actual Channel
DSSSSNR= M-764 (HS) or
DSSAC_= M-766 (HS) or
DSSSNT= M-765 (HS) or
S/C AGC A= E-025 (SIC 32)
DSS ELEV = M - 7 8 2
DSSAZ = M-781
DSS EXC FREQ = M - 7 7 7
DSS XMT PWR = M - 7 7 6
M-767 (WB)
M-769 (WB)
M-768 (WB)
Calculate residuals using the following algorithms:
DSS SSNR Residual (dB):
DSS SSNR Actual (DN)
= 100 - DSS SSNR Inst Predict (dB)
DSS AGC Residual (dB):
DSS AGC Actual (DN)
= 10 - DSS AGC Inst Predict (dB)
DSS SNT Residual (DN):
= DSS SNT Actual (DNK)- DSS SNT Inst Predict (K)
SIC AGC Residual (dB):
= SIC AGC Actual (EU) - S/C AGC Inst Predict (dB)
DSS ELEV Residual (DN):
= ELEV Actual (DNdeg) - ELEV inst Predict (deg)
DSS AZ Residual (DN):
= AZ Actual (DNdeg) - AZ Inst Predict (deg)
DSS EXC FREQ Residual (DN):
= DSS EXC FREQ Actual (DNHz) - DSS EXC FREQ Inst Predict (Hz)
DSS XMT PWR Residual (dB):
DSS XMT PWR Actual (DNkw)
=10log DSS XMT PWR Inst Predict (kw)
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VOYAGER UPLINK CARRIER DESIGN CONTROL TABLE
VOY 2 (JSX), 70M/18KW/30HZ, 0DB RNG, 0DB CMD, CLR WTHR
X-BAND TWT HP, HGA/NLC, 14.4 KBPS CODED, 2-WAY RADIO LOSSES
EPOCH 00/000/00/00 SPACECRAFT 2 STATION
TIME IN MISSION 89/119/08/00 TIME FROM EPOCH 32627 07:59
DESIGN FAV TOL ADV TOL
TRANSMITTER PARAMETERS
I) RF POWER, DBM 72.55 .50 -.50 72.6
POWER OUTPUT = 18.0 KW
TRANSMIT CIRCUIT LOSS, DB .00 .00 .00 .0
2) ANTENNA GAIN, DBI 62.10 .30 -.70 61.9
ELEVANGLE = 7.63 DEG
3) POINTING LOSS, DB -.03 .03 -.03
PATH PAPJLMETERS
4) SPACE LOSS, DB -291.59
FREQ = 2113.31 MHZ
RANGE = 4.285+09 KM
= 28.64 AU
5) ATMOSPHERIC ATTENUATION, DB -.26
-291.6
14
VARIANCE
.04
.00
.08
.00
.00 .00 -.3 .00
RECEIVER PARAMETERS
6) POLARIZATION LOSS, DB -.12 .12
7) ANTENNA GAIN, DBI 34.60 .39
8) POINTING ERROR, DB -.i0 .I0
LIMIT CYCLE, DEG .05 -.05
ANGULAR ERRORS, DEG .00 .00
9) REC CIRCUIT LOSS, DB .00 .00
I0) NOISE SPEC DENS, DBM/HZ -166.71 -.i0
OPERATING TEMP, K 1545.00 -34.00
HOT BODY NOISE, K .00 .00
ii) CARR THR NOISE BW, DB-HZ 12.72 -.24
POWER SUMMARY
12) RCVD POWER, PT,DBM
59
.18
.39 34.5 .03
.i0 -.I .00
.00
.00
.00 .0 .00
.16 -166.7 .00
.00
.00
.23 12.7 .01
-123.1
0
0
I
9
0S=
(1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9)
13) RCVD PT/NO, DB-HZ (12-10)
14) RANGING SUPPRESSION, DB
15) COMMAND SUPPRESSION, DB
16) CARR PWR/TOT PWR, DB(14+I5)
17) RCVD CARR PWR, DBM (12+16)
18) CARR SNR IN 2BLO, DB(17-10-11)
43 6
0
-123
30
2
.00 .00 .00
.00 .00 .00
.16
.16
.00
.00
.00
.16
.17
.8
Figure A-1 Uplink Carrier Design Control Table
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VOYAGER DOWNLINKCARRIER DESIGN CONTROL TABLE
VOY 2 (JSX), 70M/18KW/30HZ, 0DB RNG, 0DB CMD, CLR WTHR
X-BAND TWT HP, HGA/NLC, 14.4 KBPS CODED, 2-WAY RADIO LOSSES
EPOCH 00/000/00/00 SPACECRAFT 2 STATION
TIME IN MISSION 89/119/08/00 TIME FROM EPOCH 32627
14
07:59
TRANSMITTER PARAMETERS
I) RF POWER TO ANTENNA,
2)
3)
4)
DBM
TRANSMITTER POWER, DBM
TRANSMIT CIRCUIT LOSS, DB
ANTENNA CIRCUIT LOSS, DB
ANTENNA GAIN, DBI
POINTING ERROR, DB
LIMIT CYCLE, DEG
ANGULAR ERRORS, DEG
PATH
5)
6)
PARAMETERS
SPACE LOSS, DB
FREQ = 8415.00 MHZ
RANGE = 4.285+09 KM
z 28.64 AU
ATMOSPHERIC ATTENUATION, DB
RECEIVER PARAMETERS
7) POLARIZATION LOSS, DB
8) ANTENNAGAIN, DBI
9) POINTING LOSS, DB
i0) NOISE SPEC DENS, DBM/HZ
TOTAL SYSTEM NOISE TEMP, K
RECEIVER TEMPERATURE, K
GROUND CONTRIBUTION, K
GALACTIC CONTRIBUTION, K
ATMOSPHERIC CONTRIB, K
HOT BODY NOISE, K
ELEV ANGLE _ 7.63 DEG
ii) CARR THR NOISE BW, DB-HZ
POWER SUMMARY
12) RCVD POWER, PT, DBM
(1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9)
13) RCVD PT/NO, DB-HZ, (12-10)
14) RANGING SUPPRESSION, DB
15) TELEMETRY SUPPRESSION, DB
16) CARRPWR/TOT PWR, DB(14+I5)
17) RCVD CARR PWR, DBM(12+I6)
18) CARR SNR IN 2BLO, DB(17-10-11)
DESIGN FAV TOL ADV TOL MEAN
42 87
O0
O0
48 20
- i0
O5
O0
-303.59
.50 -.50
.00 .00
.00 .00
.26 -.26
.I0 -.I0
-.05 .00
.00 .00
42 9
42 9
0
0
48 2
- 1
VARIANCE
.O4
.04
.00
.00
.01
.00
-303.6 .00
-.23 .00 .00 -.2 .00
-.08
73.34
-.20
-182.71
38 79
13 20
9 59
2 56
13 44
00
.08 -.ii
.60 -.60
.20 -.20
-.50 .45
-4.24 4.24
-3.00 3.00
-3.00 3.00
.00 .00
.00 .00
.00 .00
14.77 -.46 .41 14.8 .03
-.22 .05 -.05
-12.33 .37 -.39
Figure A-2 Downlink Carrier Design
-139.8 .19
43.0 .22
-.2 .00
-12.3 .02
-12.6 .02
-152.3 .22
15.6 .27
2.0S = 1.0
Control Table
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VOYAGER TELEMETRY CHANNEL DESIGN CONTROL TABLE
DATA
19)
DESIGN FAV TOL ADV TOL MEAN VARIANCE
CHANNEL PERFORMANCE
DATA BIT RATE, DB 41.58
BIT RATE = 14400.0 BPS
20) DATA PWR/TOTAL PWR, DB -.26
TLM MOD INDEX = 76.0 DEG
21) DATA PWR TO RCVR, DBM(12+I4+20)
22) ST/NO TO RCVR, DB(21-19-10)
23) SYSTEM LOSSES, DB -.85
RADIO LOSS, DB -.48
DEMOD, DETECT LOSS, DB -.19
WAVEFORM DIST LOSS, DB -.18
24) ST/NO OUTPUT, DB (22+23)
25) THRESHOLD ST/NO, DB 2.31
26) PERFORMANCE MARGIN, DB(24-25)
Figure A-3 Telemetry Channel
.00 .00 41.6 .00
.02 -.02 -.3 .00
-140.3 .19
.9 .22
.07 -.20 -.9 .00
.05 -.05
.02 -.19
.04 -.03
-.0 .22
.00 .00 2.3 .00
-2.3 .22
2.0S = .9
Design Control Table
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Figure A-4 Telemetry Performance Tabulations
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B. Appendix B - Integrated Sequence of Events
There are three forms in which the ISOE may be present. The first form is
the original, unabridged file that is retrieved from a Univac. This file is
processed to generate the second form of the ISOE which is a text file
that contains only the information from the original ISOE that is relevant
to telecommunications operations. The final form for the ISOE is
generated by a program that takes the second form of the ISOE and
generates a lisp file suitable for SHARP's ISOE database.
One of the knowledge acquisition tasks of SHARP was to learn what events
to extract from the ISOE, the interpretation of those events, and how the
events impacted the building of the ISOE database.
B.I. Content of Original ISOE File
Two entries from the original ISOE appear as follows:
ERTB=89016040208X OPCH ACE,, ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++,, D---,, 0
C 4755:22: 005F, CR05,,RFS, 2, 89-016/00:00:00
N , , RFS STATUS
N ,, TWNC = ON <--> FDS MODE = CR05
N ,,S-BD PWR = ON X-BD PWR = LO
N ,, RNG = ON RNG = ON
N M.I.= 28 M.I.= 32
N _; ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
TRMB=89016105500X OPCH ACE,, AOS DSS-63 PASS-4178 (U/L PASS),,D---,63
C AOS, , , , , 2, ,AOS,
N ,, SET HI POWER TRANSMITTER TO 90KW
N ,, PER TELECOM TRACKING FORM
Each event contains 1 or more lines. The first line of an event begins with
a space. The second line of an event begins with a "C". Any additional
lines begin with an "N".
The first line of an event begins information denoting whether the
information pertains to a satellite or a ground station. Following the
equal sign is the time for the event. In the first example above, this is
89016040208. This gives the time in Greenwich Mean Time as
YYDDDHHMMSS. For this example: the year is 1989. The day is 016. The
hour is 4. The minute is 2. The second is 8.
The remainder of the first line and the second line (ignoring the "C" in the
first column and the 19 leading spaces) consist of a number of fields
separated by commas. The field before the first comma is considered to
be field 0; the field after the first comma is field 1, etc.
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The parsing process does not process all entries of the ISOE file, nor does
it process all fields within an event.
B.2. Content of the Intermediate Text Files
These files are generated as a result of parsing each ISOE file. Each event
in the ISOE is given a number during the parsing process. This number, the
day and time of the event, and a concise description of the event is printed
one event per line.
A sample from one of the intermediate files is:
0010
0015
0026
0032
0034
OO4O
0056
0067
0089
0093
0094
0102
0105
0109
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016 02 45 00 LOS 45
016 04 02 08
016 I0 55 00 AOS 63
016 13 45 00 AOS 65
016 14 05 00 LOS 63
016 14 44 31
016 14 44 34
016 15 05 00 LOS 65
016 18 30 00 AOS 43
016 18 57 07
016 18 57 17
016 19 04 30
016 19 08 08
016 19 14 I0
RFS ON CR05 ON ON 28 LOW ON 32 4 2 8
RFS ON CR05 ON ON 28 LOW ON 32 4 2 8
CCI6C (7 0 1 i)
AC7PAR (6741 001700)
AC7PAR (6742 004540)
CCI6C (7 0 0 0)
DC2PR
CCI6C (7 0 1 i)
Original ISOE File Event Parsing
The parser begins at the start of the original ISOE file and processes each
event sequentially. The parser first examines a number of characters and
fields to determine if the event is one to skip because it is not of interest
to the telecom operators.
The following examples describe how events are processed. Four events
are specified by field 12, one by field 9, the remainder by field 3.
Example 1. If the first 3 characters of field 12 are "AOS", this is an
"Acquisition of Signal" event. The first 2 characters of field 5 give the
ground station acquiring the signal. If the last 10 characters of field 2
are "(U/L PASS)", we know the transmitter is tO be turned on at the ground
station. Field 13 gives the power level in kilowatts for the transmitter.
If there is no value for field 13, a default of 18 kilowatts is assumed.
Written to the intermediate text file are the event number, the day and
time, "AOS", the station number, and if the transmitter was on,
"XmtPwrKw" with the power level value. For example:
0013 135 08 15 00 AOS 12 XmtPwrKw 18.
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Example 2. If the first 3 characters of field 12 are "FDS", this is an FDS
event. The first continuation line that contains the character "/" is parsed
to determine the data mode, the data rate, and the s-rate. The characters
describing the data mode are the 22nd character of the line to the first
"/". The data rate is between the first "/" and the second "/" except for the
first character. The s-rate is from the second "/" to either the end of the
line or a comma. Written to the intermediate text file are the event
number, the day and time, "FDS", the mode, the data rate, and the s-rate.
For example:
0215 136 16 22 22 FDS GS4A 4.8K $40
Example 3. If the first 5 characters of field 3 are "CC16C" and the first 2
characters of field 2 are "(1" or "(7", then take each of the four digits
within the parentheses of field 2 and put spaces between for the output to
the intermediate file. For example:
0420 138 13 30 14 CCI6C (7 0 0 0)
There are approximately 50 different event types that are processed in a
similar fashion.
B.4. Extracted ISOE Translation
Neither the original ISOE file nor the output of the program that extracts
the ISOE events are comprehensible to persons unfamiliar with the
notational conventions being used. The final processing of the ISOE data
accomplishes two things: build a database that can be used by the rest of
the SHARP system and translate the ISOE events into more understandable
terminology.
The source for interpretation of events came from the domain expert and
the Voyager commands list found in JPL Voyager internal document
618-804. The knowledge engineering task converted this information into
a collection of about 15 tables that the programmers on the SHARP team
could then encode into SHARP. An example of one of these tables is as
follows:
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C C 7x x c0ntro=)
I
a
1
6
7
Other
ss (a)
Sun Sensor Control
Data d SIC
Present Maneuver
nil, t in 105 sec
nil
t nil
k3NORE
|
Comments
Search Enable
Sun Point Enable
Earth Point Enabt_
2
2
Off
1
Off
1
2
On
Off
The construction of the database involved more than simply converting the
extracted information into a Lisp format. Extra effort was required
because events could have impact over a time period that was larger than
the event itself. Also, there could be interactions between different
event types.
Two examples from the notes generated during the knowledge acquisition
period are"
Memory Readout
Keywords:
Memory readouts are indicated in the numerical field of SC06BB
commands.
Info obtained:
All data should be ignored for the duration of this activity
Telemetry can be re-acquired within 5 minutes.
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AACS Maneuver
Keywords:
Beginning of activity: AC7MDP (6) (All Axes Inertial)
or AC7MDP (5) (Roll Axis Inertial)
End of activity: CC7PC (307) (star acquired)
Info obtained:
Telemetry data will be lost or distorted during maneuver
Comments:
In the case of some maneuvers, a CHKPNT precedes the AC7MDP
command. If the CHKPNT indicates a MINI-CRSMVR, then there will
be data available during part of the maneuver. Anything other than
mini-crsmvr (such as TCM) means that no data will be available
until the maneuver is completed and a star has been acquired.
Following the AC7MDP command there should be either an AC7VCD
(gyro drift turn) or AC7TCD (turn command). Both indicate the start
of a turn. The ensuing number in parentheses indicates the type of
turn:
AC7VCD (1) = Pitch turn (lose telemetry signal immediately)
AC7VCD (2) -- Yaw turn (lose telemetry signal immediately)
AC7VCD (3) = Roll turn (variations in telemetry signal)
For Roll Axis Inertial, there can only be AC7VCD (3).
The above information holds true for the AC7TCD commands as
well.
B.5. ISOE Database Access
The ISOE database is a collection of files each containing the ISOE data
for a period of one week. The database queries have three arguments:
• where: a query is directed at one of the DSS's or the spacecraft;
• what: the state, such as the X-band power level of the spacecraft's
transmitter; and
• when: at this time, what was the value of the state.
Certain settings of components on the spacecraft change slowly if at all.
Therefore, multiple files are often searched in order to determine the
state of a component. When a query is made to the database, a search is
made in the file for the week that contains the time within the query. If
an event that specifies the requested state cannot be found at the
designated time or earlier in that week, then the previous week's data is
searched. This search continues until all files in the database have been
examined. If no event is found, then a default value is returned. The
database cache described in Section 3.2.4 prevents this exhaustive search
from occurring every time a query is made.
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C. Appendix C - STAR*TOOL
Knowledge-based systems for automated task planning, monitoring,
diagnosis, and other applications require a variety of software modules
based on artificial intelligence concepts and advanced programming
techniques. The design and implementation of such modules requires
considerable programming talent and time, and a background in theoretical
artificial intelligence. Sophisticated software development tools that
can speed the research and development of new artificial intelligence
applications are therefore highly desirable. The STAR*TOOL system was
developed specifically for this purpose. STAR*TOOL is currently available
for license to industry and academia from the California Institute of
Technology, Office of Patents and Technology Utilization.
The STAR*TOOL system is a set of high-level software tools that assist
programmers in the creation of efficient artificial intelligence and
knowledge-based (expert systems) software. Included in the system are
facilities for developing reasoning processes, memory-data structures
and knowledge bases, blackboard systems, and spontaneous computation
daemons.
Computational efficiency and high performance are especially critical in
artificial intelligence software. This consideration has been an important
objective of STAR*TOOL, and has led to its design as a toolbox of AI
facilities that may be used independently or collectively in the
development of knowledge-based systems.
STAR*TOOL facilities are invoked directly by the programmer in the
Common LISP language. For improved efficiency, an optional optimization
compiler was developed to generate highly efficient Common LISP code.
When an application program is developed in STAR*TOOL, STAR*TOOL first
translates the program to Common LISP code. It can then optionally pass
the resulting Common LISP code through a source-to-source LISP code
optimizer. STAR*TOOL generates code that is tailored for each
application. There are no intermediate levels of interpretation for
execution, unlike many other software systems. STAR*TOOL programs are
executed directly by the LISP interpreter and compiled directly by the
LISP compiler. This results in greater speed and better portability to
other computers. STAR*TOOL augments the Common LISP programming
language and environment so that programs written in STAR*TOOL have
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direct use of all of the features of the underlying LISP software system
and computing environment.
Because a single line of STAR*TOOL code can translate into many lines of
Common LISP code, all error messages generated from the STAR*TOOL
compiler and run-time environment reference the original line of
STAR*TOOL source code. in the case of run-time errors, the resulting
Common LISP translation is also referenced.
STAR*TOOL provides the LISP programmer with the necessary software
tools to build a wide variety of reasoning and inference engines such as
planners, diagnosticians and simulators. STAR*TOOL's efficient
implementation also enables the building of real-time monitors. When
STAR*TOOL is run in an environment which supports multiple programming
languages, STAR*TOOL's capabilities can be utilized via local and remote
procedure calls and through shared data structures. This enables portions
of the system to be developed in the most suitable programming language
and allows such portions to be connected to the LISP application in a
straightforward, natural way.
STAR*TOOL enables and encourages the development of embedded expert
systems. Thus, STAR*TOOL could be a supervisor of many other systems
written in either STAR*TOOL or conventional programming languages.
Most of the Software tools provided by STAR*TOOL, like the blackboard,
memory model, process model and process scheduler can operate
independently of one another. However, when operated in combination,
they form a fully-integrated synergistic set of software tools. Since the
user is able to choose only those portions of STAR*TOOL that are
applicable to a given application, the problem of storing unnecessary
excess software is eliminated. Thus, the resulting application program
can run on a smaller computer than the one on which it was developed.
D. Appendix D - GEd (Graphics Editor) and
GObS (Graphics Object System)
D°I. Introduction
This publication describes GEd and GOBS, a graphics editor and object-
oriented graphics substrate designed to assist in the design and
implementation of user interfaces on Symbolics Lisp machines. GEd and
GObS provide high and medium-level facilities for using the built-in
graphics routines on the Symbolics.
D.2. GEd
GEd is a mouse-driven graphics editor which allows the user to draw and
edit simple diagrams using the mouse and to use those diagrams as
graphics objects in other programs. Shapes that can be added are lines,
rectangles, ellipses, circles, polygons, and text.
Shapes can be combined together into groups so that they may be edited as
a unit and share attributes.
The editing functionality within GEd allows the user to move, duplicate,
delete, expose, and bury shapes or groups. The visual characteristics of a
shape can be changed. Borders of shapes can have thickness, color, and
patterns. Interiors of shapes can have colors and patterns and can be
transparent or opaque. Lines can have arrowheads. Polygons can be drawn
as smooth curves. Circles and ellipses can be arcs. Text can have color
and different fonts.
Drawings that are made in GEd can be saved to files that can be loaded by
other programs. The objects created within GEd can then be manipulated
by these other programs. Within SHARP GEd was used in a number of
areas. As an example, the block diagram drawings were built in GED. The
structures provided by GEd made it very easy to write the code necessary
to change the color of the various components as their status changed.
D.3. GObS
GObS is the substrate upon which GEd is built. It is a collection of flavors
and methods for the construction of graphics objects. The following
flavors are supported:
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• SHAPE (abstract)
• SCALE (abstract)
• LINEAR-SCALE
• CIRCULAR-SCALE
• RECTANGLE
• CIRCLE
• REGULAR-POLYGON
• ELLIPSE
• LINE
• POLYGON
• TEXT
• GROUP
SHAPE is an abstract flavor; it is not intended to be instantiated. All the
other flavors inherit from SHAPE. It carries information on a shape's
location, size, interior and exterior color, current output stream, and
certain other attributes common to all shapes.
The SHAPE flavor provides the following methods:
SHOW - makes a shape visible
HIDE - makes a shape invisible
REFRESH - redraws a shape if it is visible
In addition, it has methods that control various parameters of a shape's
appearance such as color, location, size, etc.
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